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This study contains the findings and recommendations of the Future of Intelligence 
Analysis Project, an eighteen-month effort that explored what must be done to provide 
the US government with an effective intelligence analysis capability in the future. 
 
Unlike most current studies, which analyzed a small number of recent intelligence 
failures, the project was forward-looking.  It used the year 2020 as a notional date of 
reference because individuals currently entering the analytic workforce will be the 
seasoned analysts of 2020.  The project focused on intelligence analysis and organized 
its research around the themes of analyst education, recruitment, training, 
management, organization, and retention.  A series of four workshops and a capstone 
conference engaged analysts and managers from throughout the intelligence community 
in dialogue with nongovernment experts.  Members of the following agencies and 
organizations participated:  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central 
Intelligence Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the 
National Geospatial Intelligence Agency; the Office of Naval Intelligence; Army 
Intelligence; the National Ground Intelligence Center; the Joint Military Intelligence 
College; the Sherman Kent School for Intelligence Analysis; the Foreign Broadcast 
Information Service; the National Air and Space Intelligence Center; Headquarters 
Marine Corps; Marine Corps Intelligence Activity; the National Maritime Intelligence 
Center; the Department of Homeland Security; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and 
the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 
A panel of distinguished experts critiqued a preliminary draft of the report.  This panel 
consisted of the Honorable Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy; John C. 
Gannon, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and former Staff Director 
of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security; Christopher Kojm, President of 
the 9/11 Discourse Project and former Deputy Director of the 9/11 Commission; John M. 
(Mike) McConnell, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), former Director of the National 
Security Agency; and the Honorable John E. McLaughlin, former Acting Director of 
Central Intelligence.  Their comments have been integrated into this report, and are 
included in detail in Appendices B through F. 
 
The report concluded that, if current practices continue, the intelligence community 
(IC) of 2020 will experience an imbalance between the demand for effective overall 
intelligence analysis and the outputs of the individually-oriented elements and 
outlooks of its various analytic communities.  The world and the threats within it are 
becoming increasingly diffused in nature – with non-military threats increasing in 
relation to purely military ones – while the intelligence community is producing analysts 
tailored to perform specific, focused missions within an analytic enterprise that 
emphasizes secrecy and segregation of effort over knowledge sharing and unity of effort. 
 
The next few years are critical because the present time offers a rare opportunity 
for implementing significant changes to improve the effectiveness of the intelligence 
enterprise.  The shock of 9/11 has forced leaders and the current IC workforce to look 
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critically at current approaches.  The pressing need to hire large numbers of entry-level 
analysts complements these factors by providing a receptive analytic workforce.  But this 
window of opportunity is already closing. 
 
Overall, this report calls for an “integrated culture” across the intelligence 
community in order to provide the nation with the analytic outputs that the coming 
environment will require.  The project’s findings fall into four broad categories: those 
dealing with IC culture; those pertaining to analyst leadership, management, and 
career dynamics; those concerning education and training; and those dealing with 
implementation strategies. 
 
With regard to IC culture, the report calls for establishing the basis for the profession 
of intelligence analyst across the IC.  The U.S. intelligence community is a series of 
nearly autonomous organizations, each with its own way of doing business.  The analytic 
portion of the IC reflects the fragmentation of the overall intelligence enterprise.  Such a 
fragmented approach is at odds with the need for greater knowledge sharing to enable 
effective analysis of dispersed threats and other issues.  To establish the basis for the 
profession of intelligence analyst across the IC, the report recommends the development 
of mission statements for all members of the intelligence enterprise; common doctrine 
and standardized job descriptions for analytic positions; creation of standards for 
professional ethics; an institutionalized capability for analyzing both failures and 
successes and implementing best practices; increasing collaboration by crafting an IC-
wide doctrine for knowledge sharing; and mandating rotational assignments for analysts 
throughout the IC. 
 
Second, the IC must expand analysts’ abilities to consult with non-government 
experts.  The increasing importance of open source intelligence means that IC analysts 
must share certain information and knowledge with experts in academia, business, and 
research centers around the world.  This need will increase significantly by 2020.  The IC 
should provide analysts with extended external training and education, including 
sabbaticals.  Rotational assignments should include opportunities for analysts to leave the 
IC and return without penalty.  The IC should encourage peer review of analytic products 
by outside experts; expand outsourcing activities; reduce constraints preventing 
contractors from working at the same level as government employees; and develop 
mechanisms to encourage the outside world to link with analysts. 
 
Third, the IC must develop IC-wide security, classification, and technological 
systems.  Physical and information security and clearance systems vary across the IC and 
are incompatible with many important partners at the state and local levels of 
government.  These factors, along with lack of common information technology (IT) 
standards, impede knowledge sharing.  Security clearance policies also adversely affect 
analyst recruitment.  The IC should develop overarching security, classification, and IT 
standards for the entire IC.  These systems should support the analytic enterprise and 
must be responsive to changing conditions.  Current conditions severely impede the 
development of a common IC culture, and knowledge sharing – both among IC agencies 
and with outside experts – cannot thrive as long as security, classification and IT systems 
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restrict it.   The IC should create common standards for information technology, 
standardized security and classification systems, and an IC-wide information repository. 
The approval system for experimenting with new information technologies should be 
streamlined.  
 
With regard to analyst leadership, management, and career dynamics, the report’s 
fourth finding calls for creating compatible human resource policies across the IC.  
There is a need for common standards for recruitment, hiring, retention, certification, 
training and promotion across the IC.  The IC’s number one priority should be having top 
people.  Clear standards are essential ingredients in achieving this goal.  The IC should 
implement standardized, collaborative IC-wide recruiting policies; emphasize “IC 
branding” over individual agency branding in the analyst recruitment process; institute a 
common IC-wide personnel system with regulations detailing how to promote and 
compensate analysts and managers; integrate “best practices” in IC hiring and promotion 
across all IC agencies; generate standardized HR data, including baseline data on 
intellectual capital across the IC; establish standards for firing; hire adequate numbers of 
analysts to support career development, training and rotation; develop policies to allow 
analysts who have left the IC to return without penalty; and develop a program to identify 
in advance and utilize on demand non-government experts and former IC analysts. 
 
Fifth, the IC needs to draft a common IC-wide career development program.  Clear 
career paths motivate analysts to remain engaged as members of the IC.  Insofar as 
possible, these should be common career paths that are valid throughout the IC so that 
analysts and managers know what is expected of them.  The IC is now hiring new 
analysts with different expectations than the current workforce and the IC will be 
challenged to give them jobs that meet these expectations.  The report recommends that 
the IC provide multiple, standardized career paths with clear requirements and standards, 
including clear incentives to move into different career paths depending on the IC’s 
needs, and clear milestones that analysts and managers must accomplish to move to the 
next level.  Additionally, the IC should create mentoring programs and expand the use of 
internship programs across the IC, and should encourage transfers and rotations inside the 
IC.  It should make the accomplishment of rotational tours a requirement for analysts and 
managers to be promoted. 
 
Sixth, the IC needs to improve analyst leadership and management.  Effective 
leadership and management are critical to ensuring an effective analytic enterprise.  
Managers are largely responsible for the quality of analytic products.  They also 
decisively affect the retention of analysts by their leadership style and influence on 
organizational culture.  Ideally, managers are agents of change in their organizations.  At 
a minimum, they should not suppress other, informal agents of change.  The IC should 
improve and formalize educational and training programs for its managers, including 
continuing training at all levels.  It also should reward managers through appropriate 
incentive systems.  Specifically, the IC should change how performance is measured to 
reflect quality of analysis over quantity of analytic product. 
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With regard to education and training, the report’s seventh finding identifies a 
crucial need to develop education and training programs that not only improve 
analysis directly but also professionalize the analytic workforce.  Education and 
training are low priority activities throughout the IC.  The fact that managers do not 
receive consistent training throughout their careers probably reinforces this bias.  
Essentially the IC is stressing questionable short-term gains over the long-term benefits 
of a better-educated analytic workforce.  The report’s recommendations include using the 
National Intelligence University System to coordinate all education and training 
programs across the IC, including agency-specific programs and programs offered by 
universities; making as many education and training programs as possible IC-wide 
initiatives; initiating a mandatory, joint “boot camp” for all analysts in the IC within the 
first 6 months of employment; developing a coordinated education and training 
continuum for managers as well as analysts so that education and training becomes a 
standard, periodic feature of analysts’ and managers’ careers; making the 
accomplishment of mandatory educational and training milestones a requirement for 
analysts and managers to be promoted; instituting continuing education requirements 
across the analytic community; and sizing the analyst workforce to allow an appropriate 
percentage of analysts to engage in education and training without causing the rest of the 
workforce to be chronically shorthanded  
 
With respect to implementation strategies, the report’s eighth finding deals with the 
need to develop and aggressively pursue implementation strategies.  Members of the 
report’s review panel stressed that the project’s findings and recommendations were on 
target and emphasized the importance of moving forward.  However, they noted that 
some of the report’s recommendations had been identified in previous studies but had not 
been implemented.  They cautioned to expect strong resistance to the report’s 
recommendations in many parts of the IC.  This fact made it critically important to 
devise appropriate implementation strategies and detailed action plans.  They 
recommended that a mechanism be developed to maintain continuing pressure for change 
and observed that use of an outside organization serving as honest broker had distinct 
advantages over depending on the IC to monitor its own progress toward implementation.  
They recommended several areas where additional work would be beneficial. 
 
Last but not least, the report’s ninth finding addressed whether additional legislation 
would be necessary to bring about needed changes.  The project concluded that 
additional legislation was not required as a means to compel needed changes.  
Rather, existing legislation already provides the Director of National Intelligence with the 
necessary authority.  Strong leadership by the DNI, with the explicit approval and support 
of the President, would not only be sufficient to bring about needed change but also 
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This study contains the findings and recommendations of the Future of Intelligence 
Analysis Project, an eighteen-month effort that explored what must be done to provide 
the US government with an effective intelligence analysis capability in the future.  The 
year 2020 was the notional date of reference because it is near enough to make 
reasonably accurate forecasts possible but still far enough away to be influenced by 
policies enacted in the next few years.  And the next few years are critical.  Individuals 
entering the analytic workforce in the next several years will be the seasoned analysts of 
2020.  They will only be effective if they are properly educated recruited, trained, 
managed, organized – and retained, in one way or another – as assets of the U.S. 
intelligence community (IC).   
 
In general, the study concludes that the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention 
Act of 2004 is a necessary step – but not a sufficient one – to improve the IC’s ability to 
detect and warn about new threats to the United States.  Mark Lowenthal, former Deputy 
Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, summed up the situation 
aptly when he said, “The intelligence community currently is confronted by 
insurmountable opportunities.”  His clever turn of phrase captured the difficulty inherent 
in attempting to alter the form of a group of disparate organizations – the U.S. 
intelligence community – through top-down measures alone even when most agree that 
change is necessary.  While the Intelligence Reform Act embodies many appropriate 
initiatives, these will fail unless intelligence agencies change the ways they do their day-
to-day business and, to some degree, come to resemble one another much more than is 
currently the case. 
 
The report concludes that additional legislation is not required as a means to compel 
needed changes, asserting instead that existing legislation already provides the Director 
of National Intelligence (DNI) with the necessary authority.  Strong leadership by the 
DNI, with the explicit approval and support of the President, would not only be sufficient 
to bring about needed change but also would result in better overall results.  However, it 
notes that many elements of the Goldwater-Nicols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, 
which initiated sweeping reforms of the U.S. military by restructuring personnel 
incentive systems and organizational relationships, can serve as a valuable guide for 






If current practices continue, the intelligence community (IC) of 2020 will 
experience an imbalance between the demand for effective overall intelligence 
analysis and the outputs of the individually-oriented elements and outlooks of its 
various analytic communities.  The world and the threats within it are becoming 
increasingly diffused in nature – with non-military threats increasing in relation to purely 
military ones – while the intelligence community is producing analysts tailored to 
perform specific, focused missions within an analytic enterprise that emphasizes secrecy 
and segregation of effort over knowledge sharing and unity of effort.  This development 
has three main components.  First, the nature of many threats is changing.  Second, 
policymakers’ expectations are changing.  Third, short-term intelligence is emphasized 
over mid- and long-term analysis. 
 
Since the end of the Cold War, the intelligence community has contended with the 
emergence of new threats to national security from a number of quarters, including 
increasingly powerful nonstate actors such as transnational terrorist groups.  Many of 
these actors have capitalized on the still evolving effects of globalization to threaten U.S. 
security in nontraditional ways.  At the same time, global trends such as the population 
explosion, uneven economic growth, urbanization, the AIDS pandemic, developments in 
biotechnology, and ecological trends such as the increasing scarcity of fresh water in 
several already volatile areas are generating new drivers of international instability.  
These trends make it extremely challenging to develop a clear set of priorities for 
collection and analysis.1
 
Intelligence analysts are tasked with making sense of these developments, identifying 
potential threats to U.S. national security, and crafting appropriate intelligence products 
for policy makers.  They also will continue to perform traditional missions such as 
uncovering secrets that potential adversaries desire to withhold and assessing foreign 
military capabilities.  This means that, besides using traditional sources of classified 
information, often from sensitive sources, they must also extract potentially critical 
knowledge from vast quantities of available open source information.  Significantly, the 
community must devise ways to monitor open source information in transformed ways.  
Additionally, some kinds of information currently not considered open source must be 
brought into the open domain. 
 
For example, the process of globalization, empowered by the Information Revolution, 
will require a change of scale in the IC’s analytical focus.  In the past, the IC focused on a 
small number of discrete issues that possessed the potential to cause severe destruction of 
known forms.  The future will involve security threats of much smaller scale.  These will 
be less isolated, less the actions of military forces, and more diverse in type and more 
widely dispersed throughout global society than in the past.  Their aggregate effects 
                                                 
1 For an appreciation of the uncertainty surrounding how the world of 2020 might develop, see the 
alternative future  scenarios in  Mapping the Global Future:  Report of the National Intelligence Council’s 
2020 Project Based on consultations With Nongovernment Experts Around the World (Government 
Printing Office, December 2004).  Available at http://www.cia.gov/nic/NIC_globaltrend2020.html.  
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might produce extremely destabilizing and destructive results, but these outcomes will 
not be obvious based on each event alone.  Therefore, analysts increasingly must look to 
discern the emergent behavioral aspects of a series of events. 
 
Second, phenomena of global scope will increase as a result of aggregate human 
activities.  Accordingly, analysts will need to understand global dynamics as never 
before.  Information is going to be critical, as well as analytical understanding of the new 
information, in order to understand these new dynamics.  The business of organizing and 
collecting information is going to have to be much more distributed than in the past, both 
among various US agencies as well as international communities.  Information and 
knowledge sharing will be essential to successful analysis, and most of the necessary 
sharing will need to be conducted on a voluntary basis. 
 
Third, future analysts will need to focus on anticipation and prevention of security threats 
and less on reaction after they have arisen.  For example, one feature of the medical 
community is that it is highly reactive.  However, anyone who deals with infectious 
diseases knows that prevention is the more important reality.  Preventing infectious 
diseases must become the primary focus if pandemics are to be prevented.  Future 
analysts will need to incorporate this same emphasis on prevention to the analytic 
enterprise. 
 
It appears evident that in this emerging security environment the traditional methods of 
the intelligence community will be increasingly inadequate and increasingly in conflict 
with those methods that do offer meaningful protection.  Remote observation, 
electromagnetic intercept and illegal penetration were sufficient to establish the order of 
battle for traditional forms of warfare and to assure a reasonable standard that any attempt 
to undertake a massive surprise attack would be detected.  There is no serious prospect 
that the problems of civil conflict and embedded terrorism, of global ecology and of 
biotechnology can be adequately addressed by the same methods. 
 
To be effective in the future, the IC needs to remain a hierarchical structure in order to 
perform many necessary functions, but it must be able to generate collaborative networks 
for various lengths of time to provide intelligence on issues demanding interdisciplinary 
analysis.  These networks should integrate OSINT and should contain experts from the 
private sector as well as the IC.  The IC also should seek ways to include the knowledge 
of former IC analysts in these networks. 
 
Clearly, the magnitude of this challenge means that analysts in one intelligence agency 
will need to share information with analysts in other parts of the intelligence community 
– and with outside organizations – to produce accurate intelligence about complex issues.  
However, achieving successful collaboration is difficult because this goal clashes with 
the secretive organizational cultures of the various U.S. intelligence agencies.  As a 
result, the intelligence community has been criticized for “stovepiping” – failing to share 
information when appropriate—and is now wrestling with this difficult problem. 
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The proliferation of potential threats and the Information Revolution also have changed 
policy makers’ expectations about intelligence products.  Policy makers not only are 
demanding that the intelligence community provide new kinds of information about new 
things from new sources delivered in new ways, but also have tapped into sources of 
open information that compete with the products the intelligence community provides.  
Policy makers and their staffs are using these open sources as substitute sources of 
intelligence.  As a result, today’s intelligence analyst works in an environment that is 
more competitive than it has ever been, and competition is likely to intensify even further 
in the future.  To remain effective, the IC must compete with new sources of intelligence 
as a unitary actor, bringing all of its strengths to bear.  It will lose influence if IC agencies 
continue to compete destructively among themselves for the attention of policymakers by 
hoarding information. 
 
Currently, the pressing requirements of short-term intelligence collection, analysis, 
production and distribution draw attention away from important longer-term issues.  This 
has called into question the sustainability of the analytic enterprise itself because, as 
noted above, many emerging threats involve core issues of national security.  These 





Window of Opportunity 
 
The present time offers a rare opportunity for implementing significant changes to 
improve the effectiveness of the intelligence enterprise.  The shock of 9/11 has forced 
leaders and the current IC workforce to look critically at current approaches.  The clear 
and present need to hire large numbers of entry-level analysts complements these factors 
by providing a receptive analytic workforce that will support change if initiatives are 
constructive, guided by effective leadership, and sensitive to the generational shift and 
movement toward a more culturally diverse workforce that is occurring within the IC. 
 
This window of opportunity is temporary.  Project participants cautioned that change for 
change’s sake was a distinct possibility, and that even well-thought out initiatives would 
fail in the absence of strong leadership, since, like most bureaucracies, the current IC 
embodies a strong ability to resist change. 
 
History shows that there is cause for optimism.  Other organizations have gone through 
radical transformations and emerged vastly improved.  For example, the Goldwater-
Nichols Act successfully addressed a huge problem that plagued the U.S. armed forces: 
the demonstrated inability of the military services to work effectively together as a joint 
team in conducting military operations.   
 
There is no reason that the IC cannot succeed as well.  Significantly, it is not the only 
group that must deal with these considerations.  Public institutions, businesses, 
universities and non-profit organizations also face similar uncertainty in this time of rapid 
change.  They all need to analyze their present situations, determine their goals, and 
produce effective implementation and management plans under these circumstances.  
Like the intelligence community, these organizations must both share certain kinds of 






Since the study is forward looking, it does not directly address the strengths or 
shortcomings of the many analytic works examining the 9/11 attacks, the failure to find 
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq, the prosecution of the War on Terrorism, and recent 
actions to initiate reform of the U.S. intelligence enterprise.  Naturally these 
considerations were in the minds of project participants, but as benchmarks of current 
practice rather than the source of specific recommendations for change. 
 
Rather, project participants identified trends in the international environment that might 
affect U.S. interests and deduced the kinds of skills that future analysts would need to 
possess.  Participants then analyzed how developments in technology could enable the 
analytic enterprise.  In some cases, the need to incorporate new technologies to assist 
analysts in identifying and understanding new threats led participants to develop new 
organizational structures for analysts, plus new ways of managing and leading them.  
Project recommendations stemmed from comparing these findings to current practices, 
including those embodied in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 
2004. 
 
Initially, the project intended to examine the analytic enterprise by focusing on analyst 
recruitment, retention, and professional education and training, since all of these 
processes must mesh properly within a single integrated process to produce an effective 
analytic enterprise.  Those recruited must have the appropriate skill sets, professional 
education must provide the right background, training must hone skills, and the retention 
effort must retain sufficient numbers of optimally trained, experienced, and motivated, 
analysts.  Accordingly, participants were guided by the following key questions: 
 
• What skills, expertise, methodologies and relationships will enable analysts to 
continue to provide high quality, timely analysis of both emerging and well-
defined threats, at both strategic and tactical levels? 
• What kind of individuals should be recruited to become intelligence analysts?  
What educational background/backgrounds will be necessary?  Do universities 
produce individuals with the appropriate education?  What is the degree of 
variation in how university programs prepare their analysts?  How does the 
intelligence community currently recruit analysts? 
• What kind of professional training and education does the intelligence community 
provide to analysts as they progress through their careers?  Do these programs 
impart the skills needed to perform effectively given changing threats/conditions?  
Do programs for regional and functional analysts differ?  What degree of 
variation exists in the professional education practices of the different intelligence 
agencies? 
• Can sets of best practices be identified for the above areas, given that different 
intelligence agencies have different missions? 
• To what extent is the intelligence community successful at retaining top analysts?  
How do current recruitment practices and professional education programs affect 
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retention?  What other factors affect retention?  Can a set of best practices for 
retaining the right people be compiled? 
• Are there other important lessons the intelligence community can learn from other 
communities of practice such as the business community? 
 
However, as the project progressed, it became apparent during workshop discussions 
among members of the IC and nongovernment experts that the ways in which analysts 
were led, managed, and organized were also critical ingredients for success.  
Accordingly, the project expanded its mandate to include these areas. 
 
The project was organized around four workshops in which representatives of different 
intelligence agencies engaged in discussions with nongovernment experts from business, 
universities, and research centers.  Members of the following agencies and organizations 
participated:  the Office of the Director of National Intelligence; the Central Intelligence 
Agency; the Defense Intelligence Agency; the National Security Agency; the National 
Geospatial Intelligence Agency; the Office of Naval Intelligence; Army Intelligence; the 
National Ground Intelligence Center; the Joint Military Intelligence College; the Sherman 
Kent School for Intelligence Analysis; the Foreign Broadcast Information Service; the 
National Air and Space Intelligence Center; Headquarters Marine Corps; Marine Corps 
Intelligence Activity; the National Maritime Intelligence Center; the Department of 
Homeland Security; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; and the U.S. Coast Guard. 
 
A panel of distinguished experts critiqued a preliminary draft of the report.  This panel 
consisted of the Honorable Richard Danzig, former Secretary of the Navy; John C. 
Gannon, former Chairman of the National Intelligence Council and former Staff Director 
of the House Select Committee on Homeland Security; Christopher Kojm, President of 
the 9/11 Discourse Project and former Deputy Director of the 9/11 Commission; John M. 
(Mike) McConnell, Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), former Director of the National 
Security Agency; and the Honorable John E. McLaughlin, former Acting Director of 
Central Intelligence.  Their comments have been integrated into this report, and are 
included in detail in Appendices B through F. 
 
In summary, the project’s methodology can be broken down into seven main elements: 
 
• Organizational level of analysis.  While initially intending to emphasize the traits 
and backgrounds that contribute to individual analyst performance, the study 
determined that an organizational level approach would yield the most useful 
results for improving analysis. 
• Forward-looking approach.  The study investigated what would be demanded of 
analysts in the world of 2020, and then designed today’s IC analytic enterprise to 
support these demands. 
• All-IC focus.  Representatives of the vast majority of IC agencies participated in 
project events. 
• Focused on the analyst “life cycle.”  The project focused on analyst education, 
recruitment, retention, training, management, leadership, and the organizational 
climate in which analysts work. 
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• Interactive format.  The project heavily emphasized interactive workshops 
composed of both nongovernment experts and members of the IC.  As the project 
progressed, the participation of IC analysts and mangers increased while the role 
of nongovernment experts diminished.  The final workshop was entirely 
composed of members of the IC. 
• Constructive feedback via expert review.  A panel of distinguished experts 
reviewed and commented upon the preliminary version of this report. 
• Pragmatic goals.  The project aimed to optimize the analytic enterprise given real 
world conditions, which include considerable institutional barriers to reform.  As 





Findings and Recommendations 
 
Overall, this report calls for an “integrated culture” across the intelligence 
community in order to provide the nation with the analytic outputs that the coming 
environment will require.  The project’s findings fall into four broad categories: those 
dealing with IC culture; those pertaining to analyst leadership, management, and 
career dynamics; those concerning education and training; and those dealing with 
implementation strategies. 
 
The reviewers strongly supported the report’s findings and recommendations.  Some 
general comments: 
 
This is very good report.  It crystallizes and states very well the agenda for 
the improvement of analysis across the community. – Christopher Kojm, 
p. D-1 
 
The Future of Intelligence Analysis Project draft final report does an 
excellent job of laying out the key problems facing the US intelligence 
analytic community at the beginning of the twenty-first century.  It 
provides a thoughtful analysis of the emerging complex threat 
environment we face and of the formidable challenge to develop 
innovative methodologies, career strategies, security policies, ad relevant 
training to deal with it. – John Gannon, p. C-1 
 
I think the study is squarely right in its emphasis on the need for our 
intelligence establishment “to generate collaborative networks” with those 
outside the classified world, on the desirability of creating a more 
integrated and more self-consciously professional community of analysts, 
and on improving the analytic product by processes like more rigorous 
peer review.  In general I applaud this report. – The Honorable Richard 
Danzig, p. B-1 
 
However, the reviewers noted two general areas where more work was needed.  First, 
they noted that some of the report’s recommendations had been identified in previous 
studies but had not been implemented.  They attributed this fact to resistance from within 
the IC and warned that strong resistance to the report’s recommendations also was likely.  
This fact made it critically important to devise appropriate implementation strategies and 
detailed action plans.  They recommended that a mechanism be developed to maintain 
continuing pressure for change and observed that use of an outside organization serving 
as honest broker had distinct advantages over depending on the IC to monitor its own 
progress toward implementation. 
 
Second, the reviewers noted that, while some recommendations were sufficiently detailed 
to enable implementation without additional development, others required further work to 
make implementation possible.  Their specific comments in this area have been included 




IC Cultural Issues 
 
Finding #1:  The U.S. intelligence community is the “Community that Isn’t.”  It is a 
series of nearly autonomous organizations, each with its own way of doing business.  The 
analytic portion of the IC reflects the fragmentation of the overall intelligence enterprise.  
Such a fragmented approach is at odds with the need for greater knowledge sharing to 
enable effective analysis of dispersed threats and other issues. 
 
Background:  Given the complexity of the intelligence enterprise, skill sets will continue 
to vary from analyst to analyst in the world of 2020, and the capabilities of analysts in 
one agency will continue to emphasize different competencies from those in another.  
Thus, some degree of “stovepiping” in the collection disciplines will remain a fact of life.  
However, the fragmented nature of the IC is a serious impediment to change, and the 
necessity for some degree of collection stovepiping does not present a barrier to creating 
a common analytic culture (see McConnell E-9).  While some felt that calling the IC the 
“community that isn’t” went too far (see Gannon C-3), all agreed that each agency has its 
own organizational culture, a fact that produces both psychological and concrete results.  
Psychologically, it leads analysts to think of themselves as NSA analysts or CIA analysts.  
This emphasizes differences rather than similarities and breeds competition across 
agencies rather than cooperation.  Concretely, different cultures have produced 
organizations with incompatible procedures and policies.  Basic level indicators such as 
definitions, vocabulary, position descriptions, and performance indicators vary widely 
from agency to agency.  The agencies don’t train together, work collection together, or 
share information systematically.  This situation makes genuine cooperation very 
difficult, even when analysts desire it.   
 
Project participants felt that the development of a single IC culture was the single 
most important variable in enabling the IC to deal effectively with future missions.  
Providing intelligence and warning about current threats such as transnational terrorism, 
nuclear proliferation, and the development of biopathogens, as well as dealing with 
emerging threats, require knowledge sharing using collaborative networks emphasizing 
teamwork.  Participants felt that a common culture would go a long way to facilitate these 
imperatives.  This culture should be characterized by, among other things, a willingness 
to think “outside the box” and take risks, the ability to treat U.S. policies as independent 
variables when analyzing issues, and a recognition of the implications that the world of 
the future would increasingly contain more dispersed, smaller scale threats, which 
requires greater relative attention to effective prevention.  The new composite culture 
must encourage analysts to self-organize and network with others inside and outside of 
the community.  Currently analysts are not rewarded for collaborating. 
 
Participants believed that a common IC culture could best be achieved by 
“professionalizing” the IC.  The analytic community would be professionalized as part 
of this larger process.  Professionalizing analysts is both reasonable and achievable.  The 
activities of intelligence analysts across IC agencies are sufficiently similar in spite of 
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differences to warrant their inclusion in a common profession.  The fact that analysts do 
not currently perceive themselves as such is due to the historical development of the U.S. 
intelligence community rather than anything inherent in the analytic enterprise itself. 
 
Being members of a common profession is not synonymous with conformity.  Having a 
common doctrine does not mean that analysts must become doctrinaire.  
Professionalizing intelligence analysis must preserve the current IC’s institutional 
capability for competitive analysis and must avoid the danger of Groupthink. 
 
For example, intelligence analysts are to the intelligence enterprise as medical doctors are 
to the health care profession.  All physicians consider themselves as members of the 
larger body of health care professionals.  All physicians also recognize that they are 
members of a particular subset of health care professionals – medical doctors – even 
though the skills they practice vary widely, to the point that their skills are not always 
transferable across subdisciplines.  For instance, a brain surgeon cannot exchange places 
with a cardiac surgeon, but they both possess the same underlying education and training, 
and appreciate and understand the contribution of each other’s work.2
 
Professionalizing intelligence analysis constitutes a very important element for bringing 
about the greater collaboration and knowledge sharing within the community necessary 
for dealing with threats such as transnational terrorism.  Professionalization should start a 
virtuous circle of increasing professionalism fueling collaboration that further enhances 
professionalism. 
 
If intelligence is a profession – and intelligence analysis a subset of this profession that is 
sufficiently complex and discrete to be viewed as a profession in its own right – then the 
IC should adopt the hallmarks of other recognized professions.  These include: 
• A common mission statement and doctrine; 
• Common position descriptions and jargon; 
• Uniform standards of professional ethics; 
• Joint as well as agency-specific specialized training programs; 
• An ability to develop, distribute, and act upon lessons learned from both successes 
and failures; 
• A self-policing capability to uphold standards; and 
• Several independent research entities to further new developments in the field;  
 
McConnell elaborates on the concept of a single analytic culture and discusses ways to 
achieve it. in Appendix E. 
 
Recommendation:  Establish the basis for the profession of intelligence analyst across the 
IC. 
                                                 
2 The earliest written exposition of this comparison appears to be in an unpublished paper by Stephen 
Marrin entitled “Professionalizing Intelligence Analysis,” January14, 2004.  A more detailed analysis 
appear in Stephen Marrin and Jonathan D. Clemente, “Modeling an Intelligence Analysis Profession on 




1. The DNI or suitable panel should coordinate the drafting of a mission statement 
for all members of the intelligence enterprise, a separate mission statement for all 
IC analysts, common doctrine for the analytic enterprise, and standardized job 
descriptions for analytic positions. 
 
2. Create professional standards across the IC by issuing IC-wide standards of 
professional ethics, instituting a mechanism for enforcing them, generating a 
capability for culling lessons learned from both mistakes and successes; devising 
a method for disseminating lessons learned community-wide; developing 
standardized jargon to enhance communication across the IC; and instituting a 
standardized performance evaluation system with appropriate metrics for 
assessment.  Professional standards don’t prevent a crisis from occurring, but they 
help the organization identify where it made mistakes and provides core 
principles to guide corrective measures. 
 
3. Increase collaboration across agencies by crafting an IC-wide doctrine for 
knowledge sharing.  Project participants noted that there is currently no effective 
method for assessing experts’ opinions and analysts’ ability and expertise.  Within 
the IC, analysts do not know what their relationship with analysts in other 
agencies or departments within their own agencies is or should be.  Reward 
systems should be designed to encourage collaboration. 
 
4. Mandate rotational assignments for analysts throughout the IC.  Analysts and 
other intelligence professionals should be required to serve in different 
intelligence agencies during their careers to enhance their professional 
development and foster a knowledge sharing culture throughout the IC. 
 
5. Make all new systems and programs flexible.  New initiatives must be able to 
incorporate new developments readily. 
 
6. Institutionalize the development of new ideas.  The IC should establish a center – 
with a virtual component so that analysts can participate from any location– 
where analysts can test new ideas without penalty.  This includes experimenting 
with new technologies and collaborative arrangements.  Lessons learned from this 
playground must be recorded and distributed effectively. 
 
 
Finding #2:  IC dialogue with expertise outside of the IC is limited.  The increasing 
importance of open source intelligence means that IC analysts must share certain 
information and knowledge with experts in academia, business, and research centers 
around the world.  This need will increase significantly by 2020. 
 
Background:  Increasing analysts’ contact with the world beyond the IC will allow them 
to tap the knowledge of world-class experts, which is increasingly important when 
analyzing threats and other issues with non-military dimensions.  Greater participation by 
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nongovernment experts also will help imbue analyses with more culturally diverse 
perspectives. 
 
Some IC agencies maintain robust contacts and interactions with the academic 
community, especially in the technical fields, e.g., mathematicians and computer 
scientists.  These practices can serve as models for expanding outreach programs.  For 
example, the CIA’s new Global Futures Forum is a good example of an outreach 
program of global dimensions 3
 
There are people in the outside community who are ready and willing to partner, but the 
IC must modify some of its security practices to avail itself fully of their expertise.  
Currently analysts are forced to document every nongovernment expert with whom 
they’ve spoken, and there are additional restrictions about contacts with foreign nationals. 
 
There also is a bias against time spent outside the IC; analysts tend not to move outside of 
the IC because it is deleterious to their careers. 
 
To establish a framework for developing outside partnerships on a global scale, the IC 
must establish the business tools and acquire the information technology to encourage 
both formal and informal knowledge sharing.  Analysts should have multiple options for 
sharing information. 
 
Recommendation:  Expand and standardize analysts’ abilities to consult and otherwise 
interface with nongovernment experts – including non-US nationals – by issuing 
appropriate IC-wide doctrine.  This doctrine must be biased toward enabling 
collaboration while preserving standards for protecting secrets, sources, and methods.  
Increased analyst contact with outside sources needs to be an IC-wide initiative.  If each 
agency implements such policies individually, new stovepipes might result that would 
decrease overall IC effectiveness. 
 
1. Provide sabbaticals and extended external training.  Policies concerning rotational 
assignments should include provisions for analysts to leave the IC temporarily, 
not just rotate within the IC.  Sabbaticals at institutions outside of the IC would 
enhance analyst expertise and serve as a positive retention tool.  Analysts should 
go to industry to learn and to share best practices.  The IC should fund analyst 
study abroad programs to learn languages and study foreign cultures after their 
initial training.  Some IC agencies already have such programs.  These could be 
used as models for IC-wide programs. 
 
2. Encourage peer review of analytic products by outside experts.  In the academic 
community, a scholar might meet with 10 other experts to develop a project.  
Many academic journals incorporate some type of blind peer review process to 
                                                 
3.  The Global Futures Forum aims to produce networks of individuals from different intelligence and 
security services, as well as members of the academic, business, and other nongovernmental sectors, to 
examine global security challenges.  The Forum will explore new methods for multilateral coordination.  
All collaboration will be at the unclassified level. 
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screen prospective articles.  In contrast, analysts send their analyses to managers 
for review, but managers might know less about the subject than the analysts.  
The IC should expand its use of collaborative peer review tools to improve 
analysis. 
 
3. Expand outsourcing activities.  The IC should outsource appropriate work to think 
tanks, academic research centers, and companies.  This technique brings different 
perspectives, methodologies, and expertise to bear on the analytic process.  
However, Kojm (D-3) cautions:  “Too much government contracting is handing 
over key activities to others because the problem is “too hard” or there is “not 
enough time” for existing USG people to solve.” 
 
4. Reduce constraints preventing contractors from working at the same level as 
government employees. 
 
5. Encourage the open world to link with analysts.  Some nongovernment experts 
are willing to consult with the IC but don’t want a clearance.  Some leading 
experts might not qualify for a clearance.  IC doctrine should still encourage 
analysts to consult with such individuals on an unclassified basis. 
 
 
Finding #3:  Physical and information security and clearance systems vary across the IC 
and are incompatible with many important partners at the state and local levels of 
government.  These factors, along with lack of common information technology 
standards, impede knowledge sharing.  Security clearance policies also adversely affect 
analyst recruitment. 
 
Background:  The personnel charged with maintaining information security throughout 
the IC do not understand the necessity of sharing information across the IC.  They have 
not accepted that it is time to increase knowledge and information sharing dramatically.  
Part of the problem is that the IT community – not analysts or collectors – drives the 
security agenda.  Some participants complained that the IT people are not thinking about 
analysts’ needs; IT departments think that analysts are there to justify their existence 
rather than the other way around. 
 
Current classification systems are set up to handle Cold War threats.  To address new 
threats, there needs to be a new classification system.  Security is the fundamental issue.  
There has to be a way to audit what analysts are doing and determine how much security 
considerations should constrain what they can and should do.  Some participants 
observed that the IC has not employed a risk analysis approach to solving this problem.  
Currently it uses a risk adverse management approach.  Participants believed that the 
technology and knowledge exists to perform the necessary risk analyses, but the IC had 
not implemented the necessary policies to shift to such an approach. 
 
It is currently impossible to find out if analysts in other agencies are working on a 
specific issue.  Significant problems with IT interoperability contribute to this problem.  
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There are so many firewalls and barriers that one analyst can’t pass information along to 
analysts in other agencies.  Control issues are at the center of this problem.  Should the 
collectors no longer have control of the information? 
 
Analysts are users of technology, so they should not have to become involved in IT 
problems and issues.  However, they often find themselves lacking proper IT support.  
Some participants felt that analytic performance would be improved if analysts were 
teamed with IT specialists on projects over long periods. 
 
Significant policy hurdles to trying out new technology can impede the adoption of IT 
upgrades required to make knowledge sharing systems fully interoperable across the IC.  
The bureaucratic approval process for new technology doesn’t keep up with the speed of 
the IT world. 
 
The security clearance process often rules out the very people the IC needs.  For example, 
it is difficult to hire analysts who are not U.S. citizens, or who are first generation 
Americans if they retain relationships with relatives and others in their former countries.  
However, participants recognized that persons with close links to other countries face an 
ethical dilemma in that they might find it difficult to act against members who share their 
own culture.  Security is necessary, but the current security system needs adjustment. 
 
The current backlog of applicants waiting for security clearances – noted to be as high as 
18 months in some instances –hurts recruitment, as some persons who have been hired 
take jobs outside the IC if they tire of the lengthy delays. 
 
Recommendation:  The ODNI – not individual agencies – should develop and monitor the 
implementation of overarching technological, security, and classification standards for 
the entire IC.  These systems should support the analytic enterprise and must be 
responsive to changing conditions.  Current conditions severely impede the development 
of a common IC culture, and knowledge sharing – both among IC agencies and with 
outside experts – cannot thrive as long as security, classification and IT systems restrict 
it.   
 
1. Create common standards for IT.  Any standard should be interoperable and 
scalable. 
 
2. Create standardized security and classification systems across the IC.  Security 
policy needs to reflect the idea that the IC needs to work collaboratively and hire 
an increasingly diverse workforce as well as protect secrets, sources, and 
methods.  The IC should reduce the control of IT departments over security 
matters and separate IT problems from security issues.  The feasibility of 
employing risk analysis approaches to information security should be tested. 
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3. Create an IC-wide information repository.  Analysts should be able to go to one 
place to find out what information is available across the IC and how they can 
access it. 
 




Analyst Leadership, Management, and Career Dynamics 
 
Finding #4:  The IC lacks common human resource standards.  There is a need for 
common standards for recruitment, hiring, retention, certification, training and 
promotion across the IC.  The IC’s number one priority should be having top people.  
Clear standards are essential ingredients in achieving this goal. 
 
Background:  Recruitment practices vary substantially across the IC and are not 
coordinated among agencies.  Some IC agencies recruit analysts away from other IC 
agencies, creating a competitive environment.  In some agencies, managers do not have 
the opportunity to meet prospective analysts before they are hired.  While organizational 
size makes this common practice in some areas of government, e.g., the armed forces, the 
size of the analytic workforce in the IC should support a more personalized approach. 
 
Each IC agency has a different personnel system.  Agencies differ over what constitutes 
an expert, an intern, and many other categories of employee.  Personnel performance 
reviews also are non-standard across the IC. 
 
The IC has no standard way of keeping statistics on human capital data across all 
agencies.  As a result, there is no consistent understanding of what skills exist in the IC 
analyst workforce.  For instance, as noted above, there is no directory listing all of the 
analysts that work in a specific field.  If the IC doesn’t know its intellectual capital and 
the demographics of this knowledge base, there is no way to know how to staff to 
confront present and future challenges.  Moreover, as many in the current analytic 
community reach retirement age in the next several years, the IC will lose the extensive 
knowledge held by senior analysts and managers.  Current metrics fail to capture the 
impact of the loss of qualified people at any level. 
 
Even if the IC extensively cataloged its human capital, the diffuse nature of future 
security threats makes it impossible to staff the analytic workforce with adequate 
numbers of properly trained analysts on a full-time basis based on budgetary 
considerations alone.  For example, the IC cannot employ linguists in every language and 
experts on every region and ethnic group in the world.  In fact, places that became trouble 
spots in the 1990s were not great powers and were not priorities for policy makers.  This 
raises the apparent imperative of identifying in advance and utilizing on demand non-
government experts and former IC analysts in a large-scale, organized fashion. 
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Despite these difficulties, participants agreed that the analyst recruiting pool should be 
expanded to include persons with more diverse backgrounds.  As one participant said, “If 
the IC continues to hire the same kinds of people, it will continue to produce the same 
kinds of analyses.” 
 
Gannon (C-11) stressed that improvements in this area will only be possible if the DNI 
develops a world-class HR team that knows best business practices and that will carefully 
study the relevant experiences of agencies inside and outside the IC. 
 
Recommendation:  Create compatible, standardized human resource policies across the 
IC. 
 
1. Implement standardized, collaborative IC-wide recruiting policies.  These should 
be based on the best of current practices.  At a minimum, lists of desirable analyst 
attributes should be developed (see Appendix A for a list developed over the 
course of project workshops) to help standardize the recruiting process and 
expand the diversity of the analytic workforce.  HR and management should work 
together to implement recruiting policies.  The recruiting process should include 
clear explanations of the analyst work environment and career options (See 
Recommendation #5 under Finding #5). 
 
2. Emphasize “IC branding” over individual agency branding in the analyst 
recruitment process.  A few IC agencies have very positive brand identification 
with prospective hires, but other agencies combine low brand recognition with 
weak HR departments.  Since prospective analysts currently apply to many 
different IC agencies simultaneously, certain agencies are able to skim off the best 
candidates. 
 
3. Institute a common IC-wide personal system with regulations detailing how to 
promote and compensate analysts and managers.    Participants felt that the IC 
should consider a licensing period – distinct from a probationary period – for 
analysts, much as engineers achieve their professional engineer certification, or as 
nurses and attorneys must pass their licensing exams in order to practice.  The 
development of professional standards across the IC would be a necessary first 
step in making this possible.  Some participants also noted that it might be useful 
to require analysts to pass a series of professional qualifications during their 
careers.  (McConnell discusses incentives to foster greater collaboration and 
standardization while enhancing performance on page E-12.) 
 
4. Integrate “best practices” in IC hiring and promotion across all IC agencies.  For 
example, some IC agencies such as the NSA, CIA, and DIA use scholarships 
effectively to bring in highly qualified analysts.  While screening candidates for 
these scholarships is labor intensive, HR departments should incorporate some of 
these screening practices into standard hiring procedures. 
 
17 
5. Expand internship opportunities for prospective analysts.  Many new analysts 
come to the job with unrealistic expectations concerning their day-to-day routine 
and the impact that they are likely to have on the policymaking process.  Effective 
internship programs are one way to dispel these misconceptions before someone 
accepts employment with the IC.  It also enables the IC to prescreen potential 
employees. 
 
6. Generate standardized HR data.  Collect baseline data on intellectual capital 
across the IC.  Doing so not only will document analytic workforce skills but also 
will warn about the impending loss of skills through retirement.  It also will 
provide the basis for constructing the IC-wide information repository discussed 
above to locate expertise and track how many people in the community are 
working on a specific problem. 
 
7. Establish standards for firing.  Retention is not an end unto itself.  The IC wants to 
retain the best people, not maximize retention of all the analysts it hires.  The IC 
is not currently an “up or out” organization.  To what degree should it become 
one, given its mandate to be the repository of certain types of expertise in the U.S. 
government?  Several participants felt that analysts and managers currently move 
up to the next grade level no matter how they are doing.  Some also complained 
that nonproductive analysts become a burden to hard-working ones and there 
currently is no way to rectify the situation.  McConnell (E-12) discusses the 
important relationship between accountability and performance. 
 
8. Hire adequate numbers of analysts to support career development, training and 
rotation.  The IC should hire sufficient numbers of analysts to support formal 
periodic educational and training programs for analysts and managers at all levels 
of the IC.  This must include continuing training requirements.  Numbers also 
must be sufficient to support both internal and external rotation as part of a 
normal career path.  However, Danzig (B-3) cautioned about the potential for 
negative effects if all analysts receive standardized training but only a small 
fraction of analysts actually experience rotational tours of duty (B-3).   
 
9. Develop policies to allow analysts who have left the IC to return without penalty. 
 
10. Develop a program to identify in advance and utilize on demand non-government 
experts and former IC analysts in a large-scale, organized fashion to confront 
threats in areas of the world where the IC has a paucity of expertise. 
 
11. Recruit analysts with nontraditional backgrounds.  For example, Kojm (D-2) 
noted that the IC must recruit analysts “…not just in their 20s but in their 30s, 
40s, 50s and even 60s, when they bring a huge wealth of other professional 
experiences to the table to benefit the quality of the analytic profession.”  He 




Finding #5:  The IC must create clear career paths that motivate analysts to remain 
engaged as members of the IC.  Insofar as possible, these should be common career 
paths that are valid throughout the IC so that analysts and managers know what is 
expected of them.  Common career paths will facilitate the routine rotation of analysts 
among IC agencies without the career problems that currently accompany such transfers. 
 
Background:  As with human resource issues in general, IC agencies provide different 
career paths with varying levels of requirements for their analysts.  Not every analyst is 
the same or fulfills the same function.  Generalists, specialists, and managers are all 
needed. 
 
Participants stated that there is approximately a 4-5 percent attrition rate for analysts with 
less than five years experience in the IC.  The project lacked the data to determine if this 
constituted a problem.  On the one hand, most corporations and other institutions have 
much higher attrition rates.  On the other hand, since the project did not have access to 
data about the demographics of analysts who resigned after five years, it was impossible 
to tell if the IC is losing its best and brightest, or those it would prefer to lose.  Regardless 
of the answer to this question, the real challenge is keeping analysts professionally 
engaged by keeping them aware of and actively involved in their relationship to the IC as 
a whole.  Just keeping analysts at their desks creates a good retention rate but does not 
necessarily mean that the IC is operating at a high level of performance. 
 
Some participants noted that there is a gap between IC pay scales for new analysts and 
the higher compensation levels that private companies pay entry-level analysts.  If 
sufficiently, large, this is a clear disincentive for IC recruitment and retention.  On the 
other hand, representatives of RAND and CSIS noted that, although their organizations 
pay less than the government and the private sector, they have no difficulty hiring entry-
level analysts since potential hires are attracted by the perceived opportunity to influence 
the policy process.  This opportunity exists to an even greater degree for analysts in the 
IC, but the IC needs to market this fact properly to prospective hires. 
 
Generational preferences should also be considered when designing career paths and 
associated incentive and reward systems.  New analysts are members of the so-called 
Generations X and Y.  Members of these generations can be recruited more effectively 
through marketing campaigns that appeal to their generation’s specific characteristics.  
With respect to Generation Y, this group is considered the first global generation; which 
implies that an appropriately designed campaign should be able to attract members of this 
generation from diverse ethnic backgrounds. 
 
Members of Generation X and Y expect access to management and even senior 
leadership on a regular basis.  They will use these opportunities to speak frankly about 
organizational issues and expect management to take them seriously and act on the merits 
of their arguments.  Participants felt that developing a robust mentoring program was one 
of the most effective ways to incorporate these needs into routine operations.  Mentoring 
also serves the valuable purpose of assimilating new hires into the organizational culture 
in a somewhat structured way. 
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There is a need for structured mentoring for managers as well as analysts at all levels.  
However, the fact that the IC hired relatively few new analysts during the 1990s has 
produced a shortage of midlevel analysts to act as mentors for junior analysts.  Midlevel 
staff also needs mentors to help them move into more senior management positions. 
 
Entry level analysts expect a high level of IT support.  Participants noted that, in some 
cases, the IC lags behind universities and the private sector in this regard, but they were 
not able to qualify to what degree inadequate IT support was causing junior analysts to 
leave the IC.  Some lack of access to IT is due to legitimate security concerns, but some 
deficiencies can and should be corrected. not only for retention purposes but also to 
enhance analysis (see Finding #3). 
 
Participants discussed whether new analysts had that much interest in spending their 
entire careers working for the IC.  A case was made that younger analysts planned to 
switch employers several times during their careers.  This was largely attributed to the 
fact that they wanted to pursue interesting jobs over security (another characteristic of 
Generations X and Y).  This implies that they would stay in the IC if their careers offered 
sufficient opportunities to pursue interesting tasks.  It also implies that some amount of 
undesired attrition is unavoidable.  A system for utilizing on demand non-government 
experts and former IC analysts (see Finding #4) would help mitigate this effect. 
 
Currently, managers say that they have “lost someone” if one of their analysts transfers to 
another agency.  But transferring is the only option available if periodic rotations into 
other agencies are frowned upon and analysts desire a new experience that their agency 
cannot offer.  Effective rotations can only occur if the IC standardizes its HR policies, 
including rationalizing analyst career paths. 
 
Recommendation:  Create a common IC-wide career development program.  What 
milestones must analysts meet throughout their careers?  How do new analysts know 
what is expected of them over the mid- to long-term?  What are the incentives for them to 
move along that path?  How are they evaluated along the way? 
 
1. Provide multiple, standardized career paths with clear requirements and standards.   
Management should assist with determining the best balance between the 
different paths.  There should be clear incentives to move into different career 
paths depending on the IC’s requirements, and clear milestones that analysts and 
managers must accomplish to move to the next level.  Standardized career paths 
are not the same as restrictive ones.   
 
2. Create mentoring across the IC.  In addition to formal requirements, managers 
should support a mentoring environment within the organization. 
 
3. Encourage transfers and rotations inside the IC.  Make the accomplishment of 
rotational tours a requirement for analysts and managers to be promoted.  The IC 
would need to direct its analyst rotation program centrally because branding 
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issues affect current analysts as well as new hires.  More people want to rotate 
into the larger, high-profile agencies than want to rotate into the smaller ones.  
This raises the likelihood that rotations need to be a mandatory part of an 
analyst’s career progression; it also indicates that rotational assignments would 
need to be distributed according to some kind of merit system.  When posted to 
another IC agency, analysts and managers should be given real jobs rather than 
merely exposed to the host organization’s operations.  For example, first and 
second level supervisors should be part of the decision making process in their 
host agencies to broaden their experience. 
 
4. Manage expectations and engagement.  The IC is now hiring new analysts with 
different backgrounds and expectations than the current workforce.  New recruits 
have very high expectations and the IC will be challenged to give them jobs that 
meet these expectations.  Expectations include adequate IT support and 
connectivity inside and outside the IC; an ability to leave the IC temporarily to 
pursue other interests and be rehired without penalty; and the opportunity to take 
sabbaticals.  The management of expectations begins with what prospective 
employees hear during the recruitment process.  This applies, in particular, to 
what will be required of them (See Recommendation # 1 under Finding #4). 
 
 
Finding #6:  Effective leadership and management are critical to ensuring an effective 
analytic enterprise.  Managers are largely responsible for the quality of analytic 
products.  They also decisively affect the retention of analysts by their leadership style 
and influence on organizational culture.  Ideally, managers are agents of change in their 
organizations.  At a minimum, they should not suppress other, informal agents of change. 
 
Background:  Many of the considerations about whether new analysts make the IC a 
career or leave after 5-10 years have to do with the quality of leadership and management 
they experience on a day-to-day basis.  A number of current practices and policies 
constrain managers’ ability to optimize the analytic enterprise. Most importantly, the 
current climate is one in which the demands of production limit managers’ discretion to 
develop their analysts.  Managers perceive that the pressures of production require them 
to keep analysts on the line producing intelligence products, even though the quality of 
analysis would improve if more time could be devoted to analyst training and education. 
 
Managers do not properly mentor their analysts.  An invigorated mentoring program 
holds the potential to improve both the quality of analysis and morale. 
 
In general, managers are less comfortable with information technology than the junior 
analysts that they supervise.  This is an area where focused training for managers would 
yield large dividends. 
 
If analysts want to advance, they must choose either to join the Senior Analytic Service 
or become a manager.  One result of this practice is that analysts become managers 
because they have been good analysts, not necessarily because they have been or have 
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shown the potential to become good managers.  Other managers of analysts come from 
non-analyst backgrounds. 
 
The IC does not emphasize training programs for managers, and, as with analyst training, 
the programs that exist are agency specific and vary in their quality.  There is little focus 
on managers getting a core body of meaningful training.   
 
In an environment that already demands increasing levels of knowledge sharing among 
analysts, managers should look for ways to encourage teamwork and should reward 
analysts who engage in collaborative networking activities.  They also should create a 
climate in which the arguments of analysts with divergent opinions from the majority 
view can be heard.  However, instead, some managers encourage stovepiping by the 
manner in which they control the information that leaves their offices.  This approach 
apparently stems in part from managers’ perception that avoiding risks improves their 
chances for promotion. 
 
Recommendation:  Improve analyst leadership and management across the IC. 
 
1. Change how performance is measured to reflect quality of analysis over quantity 
of analytic product.  Since managers are being evaluated based on the number of 
reports their analysts produce, managers tend to use the same standard to evaluate 
their analysts.  This leads to the “tyranny of production” dilemma:  analysts have 
little time to think about their analyses because they are under pressure to produce 
reports.  The fact that analysts must be responsive to customers and clients who 
ask specific questions via email and require speedy responses adds further to the 
tyranny of production.  Analysts’ preoccupation with answering pointed questions 
and responding to demanding deadlines erodes their analytic capabilities and 
diminishes their attention to medium- and long-term issues.  Participants observed 
that, for analysts to have time to analyze, they would need to be protected from 
day-to-day issues by their managers.  Solving the tyranny of production will not 
be easy.  There can be a large time lag before the IC knows if a piece of analysis 
was good work or not.  Sometimes the accuracy of an analysis might never 
become known.  Production has become the predominant metric because it is the 
simplest way out.  Fixing this problem might require innovative solutions.  For 
example, McConnell (E-7) discusses creating an independent analytic agency as 
one way to improve the quality of analysis. 
 
2. Train managers.  The IC should standardize and place greater emphasis on 
educating and training its managers, including continuing education at all levels.  
This process should begin with providing analysts selected to become managers 
with appropriate training before they assume their management duties.  Managers 
also should create opportunities for their analysts to be in charge of projects 
whenever possible to provide them with experience and to identify analysts who 
display leadership and managerial talent.  Under current practice, managers of 
analysts do not need to have been analysts themselves.  If the IC chooses to retain 
this practice, then this group of managers must receive training in analytic skills 
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and processes if they are to be effective supervisors, editors, and reviewers of 
analytic products.  Junior managers also need to receive training in leadership, 
particularly since many senior managers will be retiring soon and there will be a 
shortage of mentors. 
 
3. Reward managers through an appropriate incentive system.  Many analysts don’t 
want to become managers because doing so means taking on increased 
responsibility for the same pay.  Managers who exhibit exceptional management 
and leadership abilities reap few tangible rewards.  There have been some 
proposals to pay managers more, but there is strong resistance to this idea.  
Bonuses have gone to analysts but not to managers.  As one manager stated, “No 
matter how well I do, there is zero personal return for that effort.”  Managers – 
and analysts – should be rewarded for creative thinking just as the academic and 
business worlds reward it. 
 
 
Education and Training 
 
Finding #7:  Education and training are low priority activities throughout the IC.  If 
there is one cultural attitude that is uniform across the IC, it is a bias against allowing 
analysts to take time away from their jobs for training.  Managers feel that, since 
everyone is overworked all of the time, it is inappropriate to give analysts “time off” for 
training and education.  The fact that managers do not receive consistent training 
throughout their careers probably reinforces this bias.  Essentially the IC is stressing 
questionable short-term gains over the long-term benefits of a better-educated analytic 
workforce. 
 
Background:  Education imbues approaches to thinking and solving problems.  It also 
provides detailed knowledge about particular disciplines.  Training imparts specific skills 
and information necessary for competently participating in the day-to-day operations of 
an organization.  Initially, the project approached this topic with the view that universities 
educate while in-house programs conduct training.  Future analysts would be educated at 
universities and then trained by their agencies following hiring according to some 
program.  However, in terms of teaching persons to become effective intelligence 
analysts, the dividing line between education and training is far from clear.  It is most 
useful to view education and training as part of a continuum rather than as separate 
activities conducted by universities and parent agencies respectively.  In practice, 
universities often engage in training as well as education.  Medical, dental, and 
accounting schools probably serve as the best examples of training-intensive professional 
programs. 
 
If intelligence analysts are members of a profession, it might be appropriate for 
professional schools of public policy, international relations, and political science – at 
both the masters and bachelor degree levels – to offer curricula in “intelligence analysis,” 
with such programs incorporating a healthy dose of training along with education.  
However, is this going too far?  Many experts believe that the best preparation for 
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becoming an intelligence analyst is a solid education in international relations, political 
science, history, economics, literature, journalism, science, art history, or other 
disciplines in the humanities and sciences. 
 
In its Workshop on Educating Intelligence Analysts, the project learned that university 
programs that currently prepare students to become intelligence analysts vary 
considerably in their learning objectives and content.  Even when universities choose to 
develop curricula in intelligence analysis, these programs will bear the stamp of their 
parent programs and will remain quite diverse.  This is a good thing, given the wide range 
of skills and backgrounds the IC needs in its analytic workforce.  However, it means that 
the IC must play an active role in ensuring that its newly-hired analysts reflect aggregate 
IC needs for skills and backgrounds. 
 
Universities now offer alternative educational formats in addition to traditional degree 
programs.  For example, some universities offer certificate programs that enable 
midcareer analysts to gain graduate level education on focused topics.  Universities also 
offer executive education programs tailored to IC needs.  These programs can make a 
valuable contribution to analyst education and training. 
 
Besides their direct role in improving the analytic enterprise by enhancing analyst 
proficiency, educational and training activities should be the predominant mechanism for 
professionalizing the analytic workforce and for fostering a common IC culture.  The new 
National Intelligence University System (NIUS) is an ideal vehicle for coordinating 
educational and training activities across the IC to achieve all of these goals.  In the 
process, the use of such an office with IC-wide authority will streamline and rationalize 
IC-wide educational and training offerings.  NIUS also should mesh IC programs with 
appropriate offerings from universities to maximize benefit to the IC.  NIUS will also 
have a research function, and is probably the best organization to coordinate IC-wide 
lessons learned.  Gannon (C-10) argues that common analyst education and training 
through the National Intelligence University System is a necessary condition for 
developing the hallmarks of a profession of intelligence analyst; attempts to impose 
professionalism from above through mission statements, etc. will not be sufficient.   
 
Analysts and managers will view educational requirements as important if the IC links 
them to promotion in some way.  For example, in the military, personnel cannot reach the 
next rank or screen for the next significant career milestone, unless they have passed the 
appropriate tests and programs of instruction.  This training and evaluation process 
should be done all the way along one’s career.  Each level should be more competitive so 
that only the best move into senior leadership positions. 
 
Recommendation:  Improve education and training in the IC to improve the quality of 
analysis, professionalize the analytic workforce, and foster a common IC culture. 
 
1. Use the National Intelligence University System to coordinate all education and 
training programs across the IC, including agency-specific programs.  In this way, 
one organization under the direct control of the DNI will know what educational 
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and training activities are available across the entire IC.  The NIUS also should 
develop and coordinate IC-wide education and training programs offered by 
universities.  As Gannon (C-10) observed, “…the failure of past, well conceived 
reform efforts will be repeated unless the DNI’s organization becomes a true 
Community institution.  The development of a robust NIU will add significantly 
to the DNI’s prospects for success.” 
 
2. Require common training.  Make as many education and training programs as 
possible IC-wide initiatives.  This will foster collaboration and reinforce a 
common IC culture.  Programs that remain under the control of individual 
agencies should be open to analysts from other agencies if they can benefit.  
However, Danzig (B-4) cautions that, if common training is implemented, it must 
be relevant and interesting.  It also should be sufficiently robust to provide a 
“market basket” of offerings that enable analysts to take the courses that appeal to 
them as most useful. 
 
3. Initiate a mandatory, joint “boot camp” for all analysts in the IC within the first 6 
months of employment.  Topics of instruction should include ethics and 
tradecraft.  Such a course would help to inculcate common beliefs and culture 
among all IC analysts.  The CIA Graduate Program – attended by all new analysts 
at CIA – could serve as a model for this IC-wide boot camp 
 
4. Make use of new formats for education and training that are available in both 
university and IC in-house settings.  These include certificate programs and 
executive education offerings offered by universities, as well as specializations in 
Intelligence Analysis as part of masters degree programs at schools offering 
Masters of Public Policy degrees. 
 
5. Develop a coordinated education and training continuum for managers as well as 
analysts so that education and training becomes a standard, periodic feature of 
analysts’ and managers’ careers.  This not only will keep analyst skills current and 
prepare them for more senior positions but also will re-indoctrinate them in the 
outlook and goals they all hold in common as members of the IC 
 
6. Make the accomplishment of mandatory educational and training milestones a 
requirement for analysts and managers to be promoted. 
 
7. Institute continuing education requirements across the analytic community.  For 
example, most professions require several hours of continuing education per year.  
Both certificate and executive programs at universities could provide tailored 
courses for this purpose, as could short courses offered by IC agencies.  IC-wide 
continuing education requirements are an excellent complement to periodic 
common education and training milestones. 
 
8. Develop an IC-wide officer-in residence program based on the CIA’s officer-in-
residence program, which places serving CIA officers as visiting professors at 
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universities.  This program will help identify prospective analysts as early as 
possible and help guide their educational preparations for entering the analytic 
workforce. 
 
9. Explore the possibility of having university professors serve as scholars-in 
residence at IC agencies.  This program could work particularly well in the 
context of the National Intelligence University System. 
 
10. Size the analyst workforce to allow an appropriate percentage of analysts to 
engage in education and training without causing the rest of the workforce to be 
chronically shorthanded (see Finding # 4, Recommendation #8)).   
 
11. Since newly hired analysts often must wait a considerable length of time for their 
security clearances to be processed, the IC should consider using this time 
constructively for initial, unclassified education and training. 
 





Finding #8.  Some of the report’s recommendations have been identified in previous 
studies but have not been implemented.  This is due to resistance from within the IC.  
Strong resistance to this report’s recommendations also should be expected, making it 
critically important to devise appropriate implementation strategies and detailed action 
plans to guide the process and maintain continuing pressure for change. 
 
Background:  Reviewers of the preliminary report noted that, while most 
recommendations were sufficiently detailed to enable implementation without additional 
development, others required further work to make implementation possible.  Further 
development of these recommendations was important for overcoming expected 
resistance to change within the IC. 
 
Recommendation:  Develop certain report recommendations in greater detail. 
 
1. Study the broader trends and activities that offer opportunities for improving 
analytic processes.  This includes initiatives and trends now developing outside of 
the analyst community but relevant to the report’s recommendations. 
 
2. Research the relationship between collectors and analysts to identify additional 
ways to improve the analytic enterprise. 
 
3. Perform additional research to obtain information concerning how analysts differ 
in terms of their particular disciplines and skill sets, as well as the unique 
problems they face.  This should include research into the many initiatives under 
way to address these issues.  Such an effort would permit the construction of 
26 
meaningful skill sets for future analysts, which, among other things, would help 
focus education and training programs (Finding #7). 
 
4. Further develop the concept of “intelligence analyst professional.”  It is at the 
heart of the report’s recommendations and should be examined in all its 
dimensions to maximize the utility of the concept. 
 
5. Conduct further research to identify best practices for constructing a center act as 
a clearinghouse for new ideas, a means to test promising concepts, and a 
repository and distribution point for lessons learned.  The center should have a 
virtual component to allow analysts to participate regardless of their location. 
 
6. Perform additional research to develop an appreciation for the barriers to outreach 
that exist outside the analytic community in addition to devising incentives for 
analysts to reach out to nongovernment experts.  This can best be accomplished 
by consulting with outsiders who might be asked to collaborate with the IC. 
 
7. Study the reasons why past initiatives to improve intelligence analysis were not 
implemented so that past mistakes can be avoided. 
 
8. Conduct further research to identify best practices in hiring and promotion 
practices throughout the IC. 
 
9. Conduct a study to identify the actual number of analysts who would be affected 
by the report’s recommendations so that budgetary implications can be identified 
and analyzed. 
 
10. Further develop the concept of standardized career paths within the analytic 
community to enable human resource departments to begin constructing prototype 
models. 
 
11. Research alternatives to using volume of production as the principal metric for 
assessing performance in the analytic community. 
 
12. Develop recommendations concerning exactly how the National Intelligence 
University System would coordinate an IC-wide training and educational effort. 
 




Finding #9:  Additional legislation is not necessary to implement the report’s 
recommendations. 
 
Background:  The report concludes that additional legislation is not required as a means 
to compel needed changes, asserting instead that existing legislation already provides the 
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Director of National Intelligence (DNI) with the necessary authority.  Strong leadership 
by the DNI, with the explicit approval and support of the President, would not only be 
sufficient to bring about needed change but also would result in better overall results.  
However, the report notes that many elements of the Goldwater-Nicols Defense 
Reorganization Act of 1986, which initiated sweeping reforms of the U.S. military by 
restructuring personnel incentive systems and organizational relationships, can serve as a 
valuable guide for developing implementation strategies for the report’s 
recommendations. 
 
Recommendation:  Implement the report’s recommendations using existing lines of 
authority within the IC. 
 
1. The DNI is empowered to bring about needed change in the IC’s approach to the 
analytic enterprise, but strong leadership will be required to overcome expected 
resistance in many parts of the IC. 
 
2. Use of an outside organization serving as honest broker to monitor 







Competencies of Successful Intelligence Analysts 





Traits  Educational Background 
Natural curiosity  Foreign language skills 
Well-rounded  Customer/client/user insight 
Clear thinker  Substantive specialty 
(functional or regional) 
Critical thinker  Incorporate U.S. policies as 
independent variable 
Intuitive thinker  Appreciate history 
Team player  Understand the difference 
between intelligence and 
policy 




Grasp of the theoretical  Skills 
Self-discipline  Effective writer 
Ability to handle substantive 
uncertainty 
 Effective oral communicator 
Ability to address alternative 
scenarios 
 Effective briefer 
Ethics/integrity  Problem solving skills 
Flexibility/adaptability  Can translate policy questions 
into intelligence questions 
Fast learner  IT skills 
Imagination  Research skills 
Appreciate own 
biases/perspective 
 Social skills 
Accept criticism  Knowledge of their 
organization & the IC 






Comments on the Preliminary Report by the Honorable Richard Danzig 
 
COMMENTS FROM RICHARD DANZIG 
 
 
    Here is Edward Bear, coming downstairs now, bump, bump,  
    bump, on the back of his head, behind Christopher Robin.  It is, as 
    far as he knows, the only way of coming downstairs, but sometimes 
    he thinks that there really is another way, if only he could stop bump- 
    ing for a minute and think of it.   
  
                        - A. A. Milne 
                          (The Complete Tales of Winnie the Pooh, Ch. 1)   
 
 
 It is the fashion of the moment to criticize the intelligence community generally, 
and our analytic failings particularly. A good analyst could --- and should --- readily 
critique many of the criticisms of intelligence analysis. What, for example, do we think of 
an analytic approach that takes one trauma --- 9/11 --- and generalizes about the 
intelligence establishment on the basis of that failure without also examining our diverse 
successes (and for that matter other failures)? The single incident approach distorts our 
sense of proportion --- it engages us in examining numerators without denominators. 
Moreover, the prevailing sense of urgency fuels a resort to initiatives that can be 
implemented quickly.  In this circumstance, relabeling and reorganization --- acts that can 
be achieved by legislation or executive order --- beat out serious study of long-term 
processes. Amidst intense critiques of alleged inadequacies in anticipating 9/11, 
understanding Iraq, coping with the war on terror, and comprehending our risks from 
Weapons of Mass Destruction, is it is very welcome to see the Center for International 
and Security Studies stepping back, looking at analysis in a broader frame, and focusing 
on outcomes that will matter not just now, but in 2020.  
 
 My gratitude for this study is enhanced by agreement with its most central points. 
I think the study is squarely right in its emphasis on the need for our intelligence 
establishment “to generate collaborative networks” with those outside the classified 
world, on the desirability of creating a more integrated and self-consciously professional 
community of analysts, and on improving the analytic product by processes like more 
rigorous peer review. In general I applaud this report.  
 
 There are, nonetheless, some significant respects in which I would like more from 
this report or at any rate in which I would like readers of the report to do more, both 
analytically and operationally. I think the report suffers from a dearth of data (therefore, 
ironically, handicapping serious analysis), from focusing too narrowly on the world of 
analysts and therefore overlooking broader trends and activities that offer opportunities 
for improving analytic processes, and from failing to grapple with the hard question of 
the relationship between collectors and analysts. I also think the report does us a 
disservice in focusing on legislation as the vehicle for reform. In my opinion, most of 
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what is needed is within the power of a strong Director of National Intelligence. Though 
the Intelligence Reform Act and, as the report notes, the Goldwater Nichols 
Reorganization Act of 1986 understandably provide models that influence the report’s 
authors, we should resist the tendency to think that anything important must be embedded 
in a legislative vehicle.  
 
 I will start with one of the report’s strongest points: its emphasis on the need for 
broadening of the network of those engaged in the analytic enterprise. The report 
attributes this to the multiplication of security threats “of a smaller scale”, the 
complexities of globalization and the increased demand for analysis that will contribute 
to prevention.. I agree with this view, but would explain it somewhat differently. In 
policing, we sometimes describe the difference between street crime and white collar 
crime by saying that in street crime we know what happened, but not who did it, while in 
white collar crime, we know who did it, but we don’t know what they did. In this sense, 
the cold war was more like white collar crime: we knew and could watch our adversary; 
the key was figuring out what they were doing. Changes in routine provided some of our 
most significant warnings and indicators. The charge to our analytic community was, in 
this respect, a call for a classic intelligence function: develop a recondite and recherché 
expertise in these arcane matters. There was little that the laymen could add, for example, 
to our understanding the movements of Soviet troops or Soviet submarines. Moreover, 
classified information was essential to making sound judgments.  
 
 Our present circumstance in dealing with terrorists (for purposes of this 
commentary, I am not talking about our continuing efforts with regard to states) is more 
like street crime. We have a pretty good general idea of what our opponents (that is, 
terrorist groups) are attempting, but often we don’t know who they are or where they are. 
Collection against this target is very different, and so is analysis. In the area of most 
intense focus for me, the potential for bioterrorism, I have calculated that the number of 
those who might be capable of making an effective aerosol weapon is over a million. The 
earmarks of an effort would be of very low visibility because the work can be done in 
rooms, without elaborate test facilities, uses of uncommon resources, or large demands 
for financing or supplies. No group of analysts can realistically alone cover the waterfront 
in interpreting the subtle clues that are available.  
 
 Another variable needs also to be considered. Biotechnology is advancing so 
rapidly that today’s high school student can do things beyond the capabilities of a Nobel 
Prize winner two decades ago. Leading edge capabilities in the creation of new attributes 
for existing pathogens, new pathogens, biological weapons that can use proteins to distort 
mental and physical functions, and so forth, can be tracked and anticipated only by 
harnessing the expertise of those at the leading edge of these fields. So outreach of the 
kind recommended in this report is, in my view, imperative.  
 
 The report is perceptive in talking about some of the problems analysts will have 
in effecting this outreach. But I think a strong approach to this problem will also have to 
consider barriers to outreach that exist outside the analyst community. In this respect, the 
report is too narrowly focused: it may lead the reader to assume that sufficient 
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determination by the analyst community, if supported by superiors, could in and of itself 
create the necessary improvement. It would be helpful, though, also to consider the other 
side of the equation: it will be difficult for many members of our civil society to become 
actively engaged with the intelligence community. To continue the discussion of 
bioterrorism, for example, members of the pharmaceutical industry will have profit 
motives, intellectual property concerns, and concerns about how they will be perceived 
by their customers, colleagues and suppliers. Academics will see publication in peer 
reviewed journals as the route to advancement. Typically, participation in intelligence 
functions will not be encouraged by their home institutions and sometimes will be 
actively discouraged. The report would benefit from talking with these outsiders --- 
ironically just as it urges analysts to work more with outsiders --- to understand and 
propose methods for solving these problems.  
 
Within the intelligence community, collectors can be expected to resist sharing 
intelligence with outsiders. But the “outsiders” will often be discouraged if they are given 
only watered-down, homogenized versions of material to analyze. They will want to be 
considered full partners. Those who recommend (and in my view correctly recommend) 
crossing the intelligence agency-civil society boundary and those who read this report 
and consider these recommendations have, in my view, an obligation to note these 
difficulties and to reflect on how to overcome them. Merely saying, that “increased 
analyst contact with outsides sources needs to be an IC-wide initiative,” understates the 
case and doesn’t come to grips with the problems. It is understandable that the report 
would choose diplomatic phrasing when it says “doctrine should be biased toward 
enabling collaboration while preserving standards for protecting secrets, sources and 
methods.” I think though, that we will ultimately have to realize that we are too biased in 
our security processes to security at the expense of outreach. Even if some sacrifice of 
existing standards (rather than “preserving” them) is required, I think that would be 
worthwhile. 
 
 Similarly, I would like to see more reflection on the difficulties of creating a very 
desirable sense of community and professionalism amongst analysts as the report 
recommends. At the outset one might note some tension between this desire and the 
desire to make the community more outward looking. I say “tension” and not 
“contradiction” because both goals are laudable and ultimately compatible, but if sending 
all analysts through training courses and assignments in other agencies is desired, then 
sending a fraction of the community to assignments outside the community is a 
complication and a source of tension. More fundamentally, the report doesn’t come to 
grips with the numbers of analysts and the resources involved in opening up any of these 
worthy opportunities. In this respect, this report on analysts is remarkably un-analytic. In 
the military --- rightly pointed to as a model of investment in training --- training 
programs are sustainable only because the Armed Services budget (and are sustained in 
budgeting) for personnel overages that sustain both training and ordinary course work. 
No such budget allocation has occurred, or support provided, in the intelligence 
community. It seems fair to ask: What would this cost? If ten percent of intelligence man-
years are devoted to training, I estimate that the cost might exceed a billion dollars. That 
underscores the magnitude of the problem. 
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 If funds are allocated to improved training, I would encourage the community not 
to invest in a single required course developed and staffed by a single institution. 
Training is good, but also (as the military example suggests) it can be dull, irrelevant, 
reinforcing of bad status quo habits, or all three. I would recommend that readers inclined 
to follow the report’s recommendation, reflect (as the report does not) about how to 
create a training establishment that offers a market basket of courses and enables analysts 
to take those that appeal to them as most useful and engaging. This would, in turn, create 
a feedback mechanism enabling us to see what training was working well and what 
needed to be modified or terminated. 
 
 The report and its readers would also be stronger if it (or they) considered 
initiatives and trends now developing outside of the analyst community but relevant to 
the report’s recommendations. For example, recent legislation created a Chief Human 
Capital Officer in each agency, including intelligence agencies. What is this official 
doing to assess recruitment, retention and training within the analyst communities? 
Similarly, organizations like the Partnership for Public Service are collaborating with 
universities and agencies to create ties for recruitment and training. (I should note that I 
am on the board of this organization and therefore may overrate the utility of its 
contribution.)  
 
Consideration of these efforts would enhance the report. But even more 
significantly, they may help in identifying what the report will most require: allies in 
furthering and implementing its thinking. The ideas here are basically correct. They also 
all have some history. Others have recommended them (or things like them) without 
success. In the preceding paragraphs I have urged some further work that would give the 
report some more analytic weight and better position its advocates to cope with 
difficulties that will emerge. Noting parallel efforts and actors seeking similar ends may 
help in enlisting support to take these recommendations further than they have gone 
before. 
 
Finally, as a means to implementation, I recommend that the report’s authors 
summarize their observations and recommendations in a letter to the Director of National 
Intelligence, requesting his comment in a responding letter on whether he agrees and 
what, if any, implementing steps he might intend. As I noted above, I do not believe that 
legislation is required to get the benefit of the ideas in this report. Strong leadership, 
clear-eyed realism, and a coalition of backers are required. It is a compliment to the 
quality of this report that I think it can be a rallying point for achieving these. Even while 
urging the authors to do more, I commend them for what they have done.  
 
                                          Richard Danzig 
                               Nunn Prize Fellow 
                               Center for Strategic and International Studies 
 
        December 2005 
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APPENDIX C 
Comments on the Preliminary Report by John Gannon 
 
A Critique of the Final Report 
Of 
Future of Intelligence Analysis Project 
Center for International and Security Studies 
At 
Maryland School of Public Policy 
University of Maryland 
By 





 The Future of Intelligence Analysis Project draft Final Report does an excellent 
job of laying out the key problems facing the US intelligence analytic community at the 
beginning of the twenty- first century.4 It provides a thoughtful analysis of the emerging, 
complex threat environment we face (pp. 4-6) and of the formidable challenge to develop 
innovative methodologies, career strategies, security policies, and relevant training to 
deal with it.  I commend the project leaders and contributors, who clearly took seriously 
an important mission for the DNI.  I recognize that the interagency team had limited time, 
resources, and access to complete its work.  
 
 The draft describes (pp. 8-24) a wide range of serious problems in what it depicts 
as a dysfunctional Intelligence Community (IC): the lack of an IC-wide professional 
identity; inadequate dialogue with outside experts; uneven and ineffective technology, 
security, and classifications standards across the Community; conflicting human 
resources standards, including on career services; insufficient leadership and management 
training; and a low priority for education and training. In each case, thoughtful 
recommendations, which should provoke constructive discussion among IC leaders, 




 My comments draw largely from my own 24-year professional experience at CIA, 
much of it in senior positions managing analysis.5   I consciously try to move beyond the 
good points made in the report to ask critical questions about what, from my experience, 
                                                 
4  I commend the comprehensive and insightful  work of the project’s Executive Director, William J. 
Lahneman, and his co-directors, Jacques S. Gansler, John Steinbruner, and Ernest J. Wilson III.  
5 I began my career at CIA as a political and economic analyst on Latin America, and later served as 
Director of European Analysis, as Deputy  Director for Intelligence, as Chairman of the National 
Intelligence Council, and as Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production. After 
my retirement in 2001, I served in the White House as the team leader for the Information Analysis and 
Infrastructure Protection Directorate in the Transitional Planning Office for the Department of Homeland 
Security and later on the Hill as the first staff director of the House Homeland Security Committee.  
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is missing and what more would be needed to implement recommended reforms.  In that 
spirit: 
 
• All seven of the project’s recommendations have merit, but would benefit from 
additional research against current IC data and recent past performance. The list of 
recommendations, over all, needs prioritization and would be more useful if 
proposals were directed at organizations, units, or managers who could be held 
accountable for implementing them. While it is understandable, the report lacks 
relevant historic perspective and institutional memory—which simply reflects a 
chronic problem in a Community that, for the most part, has only a vague sense of its  
history and an extraordinarily weak institutional memory. 
  
• The report does not differentiate adequately among IC analysts in terms of their 
particular disciplines and skill sets—IMINT, SIGINT, MASINT, All-Source, Open-
Source, etc.—nor assess the unique problems they face, nor credit many sound  
initiatives under way to address them. CIA, DIA, NSA, NGA, and INR have improved 
their recruitment and training programs against their own specialized requirements. 
The IC now needs to be able to evaluate the quality of this training across the 
agencies, and to adopt a common curriculum for such issues as collection 
management, open-source intelligence, and information sharing.  
 
• The report’s recommendation to increase dialogue with outside experts is on the 
money, even though several of the suggestions are already being done. One 
significant disincentive for analysts to engage with outside experts is the security 
requirements that make it so burdensome. The report’s proposals to reform security 
practices could not be more timely.    
 
• The IC analytic community has a stronger baseline for constructive reform than the 
report suggests but a harder road to implementation than it implies. This is because 
there are no real institutions in the Community to take on these issues. The DNI is 
just getting started, and the National Intelligence University (NIU) is way short of 
where it needs to be. Who, therefore, is going to be held accountable for 
implementation? The DNI, I believe, should put the burden on top Community leaders 
who have been reluctant to support integration of analytic programs, rather than on 
lower-level professionals who generally have supported closer collaboration. This is 
an important message for the DNI.  Individual agencies, and the IC as a whole, have 
worked hard over the past decade, though admittedly with mixed success, on the 
problems cited in the report. The DNI should apply lessons learned and build on this. 
 
• You underestimate the major positive impact that a fully resourced National 
Intelligence University (NIU) could have in professionalizing the IC and in 
addressing most of the problems the report raises. After the DNI,  this  would be only 
our second community institution, with the potential to codify and teach IC history;  
to do useful, accessible and retrievable research to address current problems across 
the agencies; to promote serious, transmittable strategic thinking for the Community; 
C-2 
and to facilitate “bonding” among IC professionals at various stages of their careers. 
I see this as a big deal for the IC’s future. !  
  
• You overestimate the potential positive impact of additional legislation when strong 
leadership would get us closer to where the IC needs to be. The DNI, in my view, is in 
a solid position to establish IC priorities and to work with the Congress to fund them. 
The Congress actually needs his help. Lawmakers quickly ran out of good ideas in 
drafting the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, leaving a lot 
of holes for IC leadership to fill. Minor legislation may be required over time to 
expedite IC transformation, but another major law, such as one modeled on the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act, would be premature and possibly counterproductive at this 
time.    
 
  It is no criticism to say that this comprehensive report breaks little new 
ground but simply replants what the IC has failed to cultivate and harvest in recent years. 
That’s okay. Under the DNI, there is hope that the sensible reforms proposed in the report 
will be harvested.  And, hopefully, the project’s sharp interagency team will stay in the 
action to both monitor the DNI’s progress and to suggest new ideas to expedite the 
transformation of the analytic community.  
 
 
Assumptions of the Report 
  
 The project team was rich in professional experience but, as noted, not in 
resources to investigate past programs and practices across the IC. This results in a 
somewhat skewed perception of where the IC is and where it needs to go. History does 
not start from today, even though our vague knowledge of the IC’s past may make it 
seem so. The IC supports a number of innovative programs led by some of the brightest 
people in the Federal Government.  And the hard experience and expertise of these 
analysts and managers would be indispensable in leading an effective transformation of 
US intelligence. 
 
 I would, therefore, question the report’s glib characterization of the IC as the 
“Community that Isn’t,” even though it is right to point up the continuing need for greater 
interagency collaboration. Technology over the past decade has forced greater 
collaboration among the technical collection agencies and with HUMINT collectors. 
There is now a real interdependence among collectors and a collaboration among analysts 
that was not evident at the height of the Cold War. This is a significant, positive change.  
 
 Analytic producers across the IC have stepped up their collaboration in strategic 
planning and production.  The establishment by statute of the position of Deputy Director 
of National Intelligence has added thrust to this growing interaction. We still are not 
where we need to be, but a lot of progress has been made in the past decade.  IC analysts 
have no call to jump up and shout, but neither do they have cause to hang their heads. 
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 The report assumes optimistically that the analytic community under the DNI will 
be able to implement reforms that have eluded the IC over the past twenty-five years.  I 
share this optimism, though I would hasten to add that the DNI will need strong and 
sustained support from the Executive Branch to make a go of it.    
  
Historic Perspective 
   
 The challenge to the IC analytic community long predates 9/11. In speaking to IC 
groups, I like to assert that it relates to the three distinct but intersecting revolutions faced 
by the Intelligence Community over the past twenty years, which have encouraged trends 
that continue today.  The 9/11 Commission pointed to the failure of the IC, the White 
House, and the Congress to align their priorities in addressing the need to reform before 
al Qaeda struck. It is important to keep in mind that the IC does not function in a vacuum. 
It interacts regularly with Federal consumers and the Congress, and they directly affect its 
priorities.  
 
 The first revolution was geopolitical.  It swept away the Soviet Union, 
transformed the face of Europe, and forced the Intelligence Community to confront a 
new, dispersed global threat environment in which non-state actors, including 
conventional and cyber terrorists, narcotics traffickers, and organized criminals, operated 
against US interest across national borders, including our own. In the decade of the 
1990s, the Directorate of Intelligence at CIA and DIA were restructured in an effort to 
deal more effectively with a rapidly changing world.  
 
  The second revolution involves technology, primarily information technology, 
but also the rapidly advancing biological sciences, nanotechnology, and the material 
sciences—all bearing good news and “dual-use” bad news for mankind.  As a Latin 
American analyst in the early 1980s, I had to wait at least a week to get a newspaper from 
the region. That was an information-scarce environment.  Today, in an information glut 
environment, any analyst can read virtually any newspaper from anywhere in the world at 
the same time or before the readers of the country in which it is produced.   
 
 The third revolution related to homeland security.  This is not just about the 
alarming proximity of the threat, but even move about the new national security 
stakeholders it brought to the fore, “first responders” with a legitimate need and 
justifiable demand for intelligence support.  At great stress to our workforce and 
communications systems, we have broadened the norms of information sharing and 
produced a new population of analysts with expertise in issues such as critical 
infrastructure protection.  
 
 If  these revolutions predated 9/11, so did the IC’s response to them. The IC, the 
policy community, and the Congress actually began to respond to this new, distributed 
threat environment in the mid 1980s, with the pace picking up dramatically in the ensuing 
decade.  The DCI established the Counterterrorism Center (CTC) at CIA in 1986, 
followed thereafter by the Counternarcotics Center and several iterations of a counter-
proliferation center—all mandated to focus collection, integrate analysis, and promote 
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information sharing.  Both CIA and DIA reorganized their intelligence units to meet new 
threats and enable technology in the mid 1990s. The White House in 1998 established the 
position of National Coordinator of Security, Infrastructure Protection, and 
Counterterrorism.  Homeland security entered our vocabularies. 
 
 The technical collectors, starting from behind in the 1990s, made Herculean 
efforts to transform. Advancing technology drove the controversial creation of the 
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) in 1996.  NIMA (later named the 
National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency—NGA) launched a major push to get ahead of 
the geospatial technology curve, while the National Security Agency (NSA) began a 
fundamental transformation to adapt to the global revolution in communications 
technology. Point-to-point communications were gone and we were into the fiber-optic 
and wireless worlds. In 1998, the Ballistic Missile Commission, headed by Donald 
Rumsfeld, included with its report a “sideletter” critiquing IC analytic performance that 
was an impressive blueprint for reform.  The FBI significantly increased its overseas 
presence and, prodded by the Webster Commission, developed a five-year strategic plan 
in the late 1990s that included goals to develop a comprehensive intelligence collection 
and analytic capability.  Late in the decade, it established separate counterterrrorism and 




 In all this activity, three trends were clear prior to 9/11, and they all appear 
irreversible today. They significant implications for several of the project’s proposals, 
especially with regard to hiring, training, and deploying analysts.  
 
     First, agencies began seriously to respond to the growing impact of 
globalization.   Globalization—the interconnectedness of networks moving information, 
culture, technology, capital, goods, and services with unprecedented speed and efficiency 
around the world—came to be  seen not as a passing phenomenon but as the defining 
reality of our age.  In a shrinking world of communications, foreign and domestic 
intelligence know no borders.  This is not to say the whole Community embraced 
technology to enable transformation nor that the White House or Congress made it a 
priority.  But the direction was set and it has not wavered.  
 
   Second, pressures within the IC veered increasingly toward decentralization, 
not the centralized models often favored by the Administration and Congress.  
Some centralization will always be needed to establish consensus or bound the dissent on 
critical natural-security issues. In the 1990s, the demand grew among diplomats and 
warfighters for a distributed model of collection management and analysis, because they 
were dealing increasingly with diverse transnational threats close to their locations.  And 
they were aware that technology existed to reduce dramatically the “distance” between 
the producers and users of intelligence. Combatant commander, often playing the 
diplomat’s role, demanded real-time intelligence support and insisted that they have their 
own analysts in place.  The defense community, in particular, accelerated its 
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transformation with the same determination that would later be shown after 9/11 by 
homeland “first responders.” 
 
 Third, DoD in this environment, gained increasing influence in IC forums and 
debates, including on budget priorities. The Secretary of Defense successfully lobbied for 
an Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence position, which was approved in 2002. The 
defense community got ahead of the national community in calling for—and 
developing—some centralized but mostly decentralized networks that would bring 
analysis and collection capabilities closer to military personnel on the front lines. This 
trend, which is evident today, is significantly increasing the demand for analysts to be 
deployed to more places in the world. This, in turn, added to the challenge of training, 
which needed to be tailored to specific missions and made available farther and farther 




 Since the early 1990s, the IC has witnessed an explosion of reform initiatives 
affecting IT, analysis, collection, human resources, and training, all topics addressed by 
the preliminary draft report.  If resources and time permitted, the team would benefit 
from a review of the most successful programs. We can review, however, a major effort 
by the IC analytic community just before 9/11. It is particularly instructive. It has much 
in common with the Future of Intelligence Analysis project. Despite the work that went 
into it, it was largely abandoned after leadership changes, which points up, again, that the 
IC will be permanently at a disadvantage if there are no Community institutions to carry 
on long-term initiatives. Individual agencies will continue to prevail against a toothless 
center.  The DNI offers the hope of teeth!  
 
 The Future of Intelligence Analysis team has had many reformist forerunners, 
whose fate should e avoided.  A recent case is particularly relevant. In the two years prior 
to 9/11, the IC analytic community, convened by the Community-wide National 
Intelligence Producers Board, did a baseline assessment of IC analytic capabilities in the 
late 1990s and followed it up early in 2001 with a strategic investment plan for IC 
analysis.  The investment plan flagged to Congress the alarming recent decline in 
investment in analysis across the Community and the urgent need to build or strengthen 
interagency training, data-base interoperability, IC collaborative networks, a system of 
issue prioritization, links to outside experts, and an effective open-source strategy.6  
 
 The Plan described the environment for analysts this way in the months prior to 
9/11: 
 
 “The stress on IC analytic resources today literally comes from all sides.  The 
demands from both customers and collectors in the policymaking, defense, and law 
enforcement communities have grown significantly in volume and complexity over the 
                                                 
6 Assistant Director of Central Intelligence for Analysis and Production, Strategic Investment Plan for 
Intelligence Community Analysis , Washington, D.C., Central Intelligence Agency,  February 2001.  
Unclassified version available on the web. 
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past decade.  Analysis today must support the intelligence process end to end:  
identifying customer needs and the information gaps for clandestine collection; assisting 
collectors in targeting assets and evaluating raw reports; processing and exploiting 
increasing output from technical collection; engaging in procurement decisionmaking; 
and producing first-rate analysis for consumers.  The analytic community recognizes that 
it also has a special overriding responsibility to make sense of a fast-moving world for 
the benefit of both consumers and collectors.  Substance must come first. 
 
• We face a dispersed, complex, and “asymmetric” threat environment in which 
information technology makes everything move faster; in which strategic and 
tactical requirements are becoming more blurred; and in which diverse and 
shifting priorities increase the demands from consumers for expert analysis in 
real time and from collectors who, more than ever, need sustained guidance on 
priorities and greater assistance with exploitation.  
• Our military commanders, reflecting a convergence of the national and 
warfighting communities, are increasingly doubling as diplomats who need more 
and better intelligence estimates, as well as stronger tactical intelligence support 
to cover fast-breaking developments in their vast areas of responsibility. 
• Our diplomats need more effective intelligence support to do their jobs in 
increasingly complex situations.  Diplomatic reporting, meanwhile, is in high 
demand but steady decline, as the State Department cuts back in response to 
diminishing resources. 
• Analysts at the National Security Agency (NSA) and the National Imagery and 
Mapping Agency (NIMA) require greater assistance in prioritizing issues as they 
confront increasing ex0ploitation challenges from new collection capabilities. 
 
 All the IC’s analytic program managers today are struggling with resource issues 
as they attempt to prioritize their work; to enhance skills and tradecraft training; to 
deploy more analysts to policy agencies and to the field; to improve consumer support; to 
exploit rapidly advancing technologies to help analysts do their jobs and to meet growing 
requirement from collectors for guidance; and to develop outside partnerships as a 
source of technology and substantive expertise.” 
 
 The Strategic Investment Plan went on to recommend six budgetary priorities for 
investment:  
 
• “Establishing an interagency training program to recapitalize analytic expertise. 
• Ensuring that databases are accessible and interoperable to enhance 
collaboration and leverage expertise across the IC.  
• Creating a collaborative working environment to link analysts and connect them 
to collectors, customers, allies, and outside experts. 
• Building an agile framework and process to help in prioritizing substantive 
requirement for analysis and collection.  
• Leveraging outside expertise to broaden our knowledge base and enhance 
analytic capability.  
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• Developing an effective open source strategy to take advantage of the wealth of 
unclassified information, which is often critical to analysis.” 7 
 
 All of this should have a familiar ring.  The point here is not that the current 
team’s work has been done before.  The team should see the prior effort merely as a case 
study to critique or a foundation to build on.  The point I want to stress is that the hard 
research and worthy recommendations of the strategic planners had no institutional 
means to make it enduring. This explains my enthusiasm for a National Intelligence 
University.  
  
National Intelligence University 
 
 I strongly advocate a real rather than virtual National Intelligence University 
(NIU) because it would be a Community institution—only the second after the DNI. If 
properly resourced, it would have the DNI backing and the interagency intellectual 
firepower to look ahead strategically as a Community.  And it would develop the 
“institutional memory” to look back in a constant process of learning lessons.  If  the 
team  succeeded in advancing this one recommendation, it would have achieved a major 
breakthrough that has eluded comparable task forces for generations.  And it would 
improve prospects of the team’s other recommendations. 
 
 Over my career, especially in the senior analytic positions I held, I saw the good 
work of countless task forces perish over time—and become virtually irretrievable-- 
because no organization or leader took ownership. This is especially true of IC task 
forces, which program managers have often been quick to disown or ignore.  In this 
sense, we have not made ourselves a “learning organization.” And we have lacked 
credibility and resolve in stating where we want to go because we have been unable to 
say where we have been. 
 
 The NIU recommendation has been kicking around in various forms for some 
time The analytic community, in its Strategic Investment Plan of 2001, recommended the 
establishment first of a virtual university to connect the training programs of the IC 
agencies, to develop an inventory of course offerings, and to establish a common core 
curriculum that could bring the intelligence disciplines together more often for training 
and education. The IC top analysts viewed the virtual campus as transitional to a 
university system in which a strong central institution would dominate agency-specific 
programs and would naturally draw students from across the Community for high-quality 
training at various stages in their careers.    
 
 The motivating principle behind the NIU, as I came to appreciate it, is that the 
best way to professionalize the Intelligence Community is to have intelligence officers 
learn about each other—the whole profession-- rather than just about their own 
discipline. The SIGINT analyst should study the world of the IMINT and all-source 
analyst with the objective of understanding the contributions of the other disciplines to 
the broader intelligence mission.  The NIU would be a leading factor in professionalizing 
                                                 
7All material in quotes from Ibid, pp7-9. 
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the IC because it would provide the intellectual environment and rigorous curriculum to 
produce a generation of intelligence officers who could define and defend the whole 
intelligence business as a profession.  
 
 The NIU would be a major center for engaging outside experts.  As the head 
analysts conceived it, it would develop a strong core curriculum focusing on collection 
management, language and cultural studies, analytic tradecraft, leadership and 
management, career development, security, serving policymakers, open-source strategies, 
and effective Congressional relations.  It would teach the principles of information 
sharing, with all its legal and bureaucratic complexities. It would look back thoroughly at 
intelligence successes and failures, and it would look ahead boldly at where geopolitics 
and technology are likely to take us. And, most important to IC analysts, it would bring 
professionals from different agencies together to deepen their professional knowledge but 
also to get to know and respect one another at multiple stages of their careers. For the IC 
professional, the NIU would be about “us” in the Community, not “me” in my agency.  
 
 I have the pleasure of teaching a graduate course at Georgetown on intelligence 
analytic successes and failures. We have had many of both.  The failures would include 
Pearl Harbor, the Cuban missile crisis in 1962, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the Soviet 
biological weapons program, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979,  India’s nuclear 
test in 1998, and, of course, Iraq WMD in 2002.  When good students study these issues, 
they do not come away with a cynical view of the IC.  Instead, they come to appreciate 
the unrelenting challenge of intelligence officers to deal with high-stakes issues with 
limited information amidst vast uncertainties in a high-pressure environment in which 
tradecraft, policy, and politics interact.  Many of my students end the course excited 
about the prospects of working in the IC. 
 
 The fact today, however, is that there is minimal effort within the IC to teach its 
own history. Few analysts know much about the history of intelligence successes and 
failures.  Not many, in fact, could tell you the names of the last half dozen directors of 
their agency, let alone any leader but the incumbent of other IC agencies.  If we want to 




Project’s Other Recommendations 
 
• New Legislation:  I say no to major legislation, perhaps to “fixer-upper” bills 
along the way. This is the time to support the DNI to stabilize the transformation 
process in consultation with the White House and the Congress.  I was working 
on the Hill during the drafting of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism 
Prevention Act of 2004.  It was put together hastily by members of Congress with 
different agendas. It left a lot of holes that only smart leaders can fill.  Its principal 
provision, the creation of the DNI, should be seen in a positive light, but only as 
opportunity, not a done deal for transformation.  Further legislation at this time, 
including a Goldwater-Nichols type law for the IC, would run into 
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counterproductive interplay between the Administration and the Congress, and we 
would likely end up with a result way short of what its proponents intended.  And 
this leaves aside any discussion of whether a Goldwater-Nichols approach is 
applicable to the IC. My own judgment is that there it would prove long on 
promise, short on delivery.  
 
• Cultural Issues:  The report accurately describes a constellation of separate IC 
agencies that resist a common identity.  It proposes an effort to professionalize the 
IC through such measures as: 
 
 --“a common mission statement and doctrine; 
 --Common mission descriptions and jargon; 
 --Uniform standards of professional ethics; 
 --Joint as well as agency-specific specialized training programs; 
 --An ability to develop, distribute, and act upon lessons learned from both 
 successes and failures; 
 --A self-policing capability to uphold standards; and 
 --Several independent entities to further new developments in the field”  
 
 These are all worthy suggestions, but they are more likely to be the effects of a 
healthy Community rather than drivers in creating one.  Endless precedents, I believe, 
make my case. I would argue that the transformation to a strong IC will need an 
institutional center of gravity, which I would place with the DNI and the NIU. The DNI 
would have the authority to mandate such proposals and a staff to monitor 
implementation over the long term.  The NIU would be critical in research, analysis, 
evaluation, and as the substantive underpinning of sound strategic planning.  
 
 We cannot beat powerful institutions, i.e, the principal intelligence agencies, with 
disembodied ideas, however powerful and persuasive.  The IC needs its own institutions 
to integrate the Community.  
 
• Dialogue With Outside Experts: The analytic community has no choice but to 
pursue outside expertise in today’s complex world that is so glutted with 
information but short of easy access to the right answer. In my four years as 
Chairman of the National Intelligence Council, virtually every estimate we did 
required collaboration with outside experts who knew more than we did on 
important issues. The IC’s analysis will be degraded if its analysts cannot benefit 
from regular interaction with subject matter experts in their fields. The team 
makes useful suggestions to address this problem, though I would look for more 
work on this.  I would offer that the IC needs to deal frontally with outdated 
security policies that hinder this dialogue. 
 
• Overarching Technological, Security, and Classification Standards:  This is a 
longstanding, persistent problem that only can be addressed by strong and 
sustained intervention by the DNI.  I would recommend that the DNI establish IC 
governance of these priority issues, which would include technical and 
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substantive folks, producers and users at the policymaking table. On Security, I 
would advocate governance that would include senior analytic managers in 
collaboration with security professionals in developing and adopting policy.  
 
• Leadership, Management, and Career Dynamics:  This is an epic  mission for the 
DNI, with some help from the NIU. If we examine the recent efforts at HR reform 
at CIA, DoD, and DHS, it is clear that the best laid plans run into formidable 
roadblocks when employees’ careers and compensations are involved.  The team 
has made useful suggestions but, to implement them, the DNI needs to develop a 
world-class HR team that knows best business practices and that will carefully 
study the relevant experiences of agencies inside and outside the IC. 
 
  
• IC-wide Career Development Program:  A laudable goal.  Good suggestions from 
the team.  Past IC efforts have stumbled.  The DNI would need a powerful HR 
staff to carry this off.  
 
• Improve Analyst Leadership and Management Across the IC:  The team had 
identified a core problem here. Again, useful suggestions.  Lasting solutions 
would require the DNI to make leadership accountable throughout the IC, and the 
NIU to make leadership training a top priority—both achievable if the DNI and 
NIU are “institutionalized.” 
 
• Make Training a Priority:  The team describes a chronic problem in the IC, and a 
growing one in the warp-speed era of globalization.  Operational requirements 
invariably trump training needs, just as current intelligence tends to push aside 
goals for strategic analysis. The DNI is now positioned to monitor this 
misallocation of resources across agencies, and to redress the balance. The goal 
should be to minimize the negative impact of these problems, not eliminate 




Perspective on the Future 
 
 The US Intelligence Community today is one on the world’s largest information 
companies, not just a technical-collection or espionage service. It is directly challenged 
by the IT revolution to exploit the glut of open-source information; to access the best 
source of expertise on national security issues, wherever they reside and to make the 
operation focus global.  The IT Revolution has literally transformed the IC workplace, 
significantly raised it customer’s expectation in Washington and in the field, and fast-
forwarded the movement of the complicated and dangerous world it covers.  
  
 Transformation affects all players in the IC, who must see intelligence more as a 
collaborative and less a competitive business.  Technical collectors, primarily the 
National Security Agency and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, are 
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challenged as never before to combine resources, to exploit together technologies of 
common application, and to integrate their collection strategies.  And the espionage 
service, in its vital mission to “steal secrets,” is impelled to blend foreign and domestic 
perspectives, to fuse classified and unclassified information, and to collaborate with other 
collection disciplines in the difficult effort to penetrate evasive, fast-moving targets. 
 
 Congress and the White House now want a national intelligence capability 
integrating Federal, state, and local governments, and, when appropriate, the private 
sector in a secure collaborative network to stop our enemies before act and to confront all 
those adversaries capable of using global networks to attack our people, our physical and 
cyber infrastructure, and our space systems.  These include proliferators, international 
terrorists, organized criminals, narcotics traffickers, and countries big and small—
working alone or in combination against US interests.  We also must be prepared to deal 
with the impact of potentially catastrophic events such as global pandemics and financial 
crises like that of 1998. 
 
 We are challenged, then,  to build a national collaborative network—including 
Federal, state, and local governments, and the private sector—that can bring together in 
real time the  best information, the foremost experts, and well-trained first responders to 
meet any threat to the homeland.  This is the goal.  Achieving it is a long-term 
proposition in which we must confront the twin obstacles of smarter, more capable 
adversaries and of persistent, change-resistant US bureaucracies. And it will require 
intelligence officers who are more knowledgeable than ever of their profession.  
 
  My core argument in this paper is that the failure of past, well conceived reform 
efforts will be repeated unless the DNI’s organization becomes a true Community 
institution. The development of a robust NIU will add significantly to theDNI’s prospects 
for success. Geopolitics, technology, and  the rapid-fire requirements of smart consumers 
are forcing greater collaboration, including across the national and defense communities. 
Intelligence is no longer, if ever it was, a job for “singletons.” Today’s intelligence 
officer is more and more part of an interagency team, contributing his or her particular 
skills and expertise to the broader IC effort that preserves America’s edge in the world.  
The more intelligence becomes a team effort, the more it becomes a distinct profession 
that can be codified, taught, and celebrated by its proud adherents.  But it will take IC 
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This is a very good report.  It crystallizes and states very well the agenda for the 
improvement of analysis across the community.  None of its ideas are shocking or new; 
most of them have been in circulation for the past decade; few of them have been 
achieved.   They have been supported in reports by the Senate Select Committee on 
Intelligence, by the Congressional Joint Inquiry, and by the 9/11 Commission; many of 
these ideas have been written into the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act.   
None of them are inconsistent with the work of worthy commissions, panels, and 
oversight committees.  They have wide support from inside the analytic community, and 
yet they remain undone.  Why?    
 
Analysis has simply not been a priority for the leadership of the intelligence community 
over the past two decades.  Attention has been focused on big-ticket technical systems, 
and the collection those big-ticket items can produce.   The needs of the analyst and the 
analytic profession have not been a priority.   
 
The paper is right – it is a hopeful time, when people inside and outside the community 
believe that great things can be accomplished.   The Director of National Intelligence, in 
his first extensive public speech in September 2005, said that his three priorities are (1) 
improving analysis; (2) building a sense of community; and (3) getting his arms around 
the budget process.  If the DNI achieves # 2 and # 3, he will be in a far better position to 
achieve #1.  There is a window of opportunity, and the DNI can make very significant 
strides in improving the quality of analysis.    But the paper is right that the window is 
temporary, and requires forthright action now.  
 
Description of the Problem in this paper (pp.4-6) is very good.  It encapsulates 
exceptionally well – as well as I have seen it stated – the changing nature of the threat 
environment.   Prevention of security threats as a goal for the analytic profession is a 
powerful metaphor from the world of medicine and infectious diseases; how to achieve it 
is more problematic, and I am not sure you want to keep this point in the paper unless 
you develop it further in a constructive and tangible way.   
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The changing nature of policymaker expectations is also stated very well.  Policymakers 
have their own sources of information; they develop and use those sources and rely on 
them.  The analyst is in a competitive information environment, most of which is open 
source or at any rate outside of intelligence channels, and so the analyst today has a 
higher bar to cross for him to be relevant.    At the same time, the more the policymaker 
leans on the analyst to do his job in terms of day-to-day intelligence support, the harder it 
is for the analyst to focus on the critically important medium- to long-term issues.   When 
an issue is hot and/or the policymaker appetite for information is whetted, no manager I 
know has yet has been able to balance successfully the short versus long term analytic 
requirement.  
 
Project design.  I think the authors made exactly the right judgment in expanding the 
scope of the project from the human capital issues (recruitment, education, training and 
retention) to management, organization and leadership.  The human capital questions are 
necessary but alone not sufficient to transform the analytic community.  The paper is 
absolutely right about the importance of leadership, both to bring about change and to 
sustain those changes.  
 
IC Cultural Issues.   I found myself in strong agreement with the findings and 
recommendations in this section.  I wrote “I agree” and put exclamation points next to 
most paragraphs.   
 
The return of the medical analogy again is a very powerful one.  I agree: there must be a 
system of professional development for analysts – with its own education, training, code 
of ethics and professional élan – just as there is for the medical profession.  The analogy 
is powerful also in recognizing that Middle East analysts cannot replace East Asia 
analysts in the same way that an internist cannot replace a brain surgeon, yet they are all 
part of the same profession and share education and values.   
 
Even as I cheer on this notion professional development, it must be noted that the analogy 
fails on a crucial point:  We need analysts entering the profession not just in their 20s but 
in their 30s, 40s, 50s and even 60s, when they bring a huge wealth of other professional 
experiences to the table to benefit the quality of the analytic profession.   For the analytic 
profession to be vital, there must be very considerable ease of entry into it – and analysts 
must be encouraged to depart it for years at a time to pick up new skills so they are more 
valuable when they return.   The analytic profession needs to have an ease of entry in the 
same way that political life does in this country -- where political leaders come from all 
backgrounds at all ages.   We would not want to be governed by a political caste that was 
trained in its twenties and then held all political leadership positions for the next 40 years; 
why do we think the quality of our analysis would be better from within the confines of a 
rigidly structured professional class?   
 
The State Department’s Intelligence and Research Bureau, widely recognized as a small 
but exceptionally high quality analytic shop, benefits from precisely this ease of entrée, 
exit and return.  A significant portion of the analytic staff (approximately 1/3rd) is made 
up of Foreign Service officers who bring to bear their language and country expertise and 
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recent on-the-ground experience are enormously valuable when blended with the longer 
term, almost academic expertise of civil servants who have been on the same account 
sometimes for decades.   These Foreign Service officers serve for a time as intelligence 
officers, leave, and then often come back again to refresh the work of the analytic 
community.   Each analytic shop in the community needs to draw on a similar wealth of 
talent outside the immediate confines of its own personnel.   
 
Two points under Finding # 1 (p.11) that I found unhelpful: “Make all systems and 
programs flexible (point number 5).”   Sounds great; I am all for it.  I don’t have the 
slightest idea what you mean.  Unless you develop the point, I would just drop it.  Point 
6: the IC should establish a “playground.”  This possibly very valuable idea should be 
developed in greater detail – or just dropped.   The real value of this paper should be to 
give senior leadership in the IC tangible, actionable plans  -- to tell them what it is they 
should do and how to get it done.  
 
Finding #2 on dialogue with expertise outside the IC is an absolutely essential point 
(pp.11-12).  I found myself almost shouting in response to all the good ideas included – 
robust contacts and interactions outside the community, multiple options for information 
sharing, sabbaticals, studying foreign languages and culture, encouraging consultation on 
an unclassified basis.  I could add even more: the need for constant interaction with 
FOREIGNERS – from all professions, and from all countries, including Russia, China, 
Israel, and many others.  Yet everything under Finding and Recommendation 12 is 
stymied by security rules that block it from happening.    
 
Unless and until the Security Regime is changed - -and preferably with someone put in 
charge with a strong analytic background, or non-intelligence community security 
background – NONE of these changes will ever occur, and analysis will NEVER get 
better in the ways that this paper deems essential.    
 
Even security officials today talk a good game about “risk management,” but the DNI 
needs to take the courageous step to transform the entire definition of security to 
recognize that the information business is too important and too dynamic to led outmoded 
security structures confine it.  No scientific community has ever made progress behind 
closed doors and national barriers:  why do we think that the information analysis 
endeavor is any different? 
 
On recommendation #3 (p.12) on outsourcing, be careful:  The analytic profession 
shouldn’t give over its essential core activity to contractors.   The work should be defined 
as essential tools or techniques that the IC needs to develop or learn to enhance its central 
mission.  Too much government contracting is handing over key activities to others 
because the problem is “too hard” or there is “not enough time” for existing USG people 
to solve.  Too often a lot of money is spent and no new knowledge is incorporated within 
the USG’s own human capital.   
 
Finding # 3 on physical and information security.  Comments about people in charge of 
IT security hindering analysts, and comments about the bureaucratic approval process for 
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IT running far behind changes in the IT world are accurate and, if anything, too mild.  
The system does not need reform: It needs revolution.   The heart of the new system must 
be to let analysts go forth and do their profession – and that every electronic 
communication and page or web site visited is always and everywhere open to tracking 
and inspection.   Confidence needs to be placed in analysts, and at the same time analysts 
need to know their electronic life is an open book (to security).   We need a system of 
“Trust but Verify” – instead of “Mother, May I?” where the answer is always no.  
 
Standardized security clearance systems and standardized classification systems are 
essential.  Every clearance in every IC agency must be reciprocally recognized and 
accepted by every other agency.  No exceptions.  Every exception harms building a 
unified IC culture and identity, and harms analytic cooperation.   Every failure to share 
information potentially costs lives.   The adage today should be “closed lips sink ships” 
because somebody failed to share the information that could get timely warning to the 
captain and crew.   
 
Finding #4 Analyst Leadership, Management and Career Dynamics (pp.14-16)  Most of 
these recommendations are exactly on the mark:  standard and collaborative IC-wide 
recruiting policies, generating standard personnel data, developing a common personnel 
system, standards for firing, and policies to enable analysts to leave and return without 
penalty (an essential step).  
 
Internships (p.16) are absolutely vital to bring new blood into a profession, at low cost 
and a low transaction cost.  You don’t spend a fortune on recruitment and clearances to 
give an intern a chance.  Every profession has interns, and uses the practice to very great 
benefit in (mutually) attracting the right personnel.    
 
Also important here – and the paper is exactly right – is the importance of an adequate 
numbers of analysts so that there can be rotations for career development and training.  
The analytic profession will never get better – and arguably will get worse – if there are 
not planned, scheduled rotations for professional development and training. 
 
Some disappointments in this section are recommendations on behalf of things that (I 
thought) had been accomplished years ago.   On page 14, bottom paragraph:  Wasn’t the 
whole point of John Gannon’s effort in the late 1990s to create an “analytic baseline” 
precisely to inventory the analysts in given fields?  Likewise, page 16, number 10 at the 
bottom: during the 1990s, much was made of the effort to create a “Global Reserve” of 
non-government analysts in various fields where the IC itself did not have depth.   The 
question becomes: Since these good ideas have been in circulation for some time, why 
weren’t they accomplished?  We know that leaders tried to accomplish them: what went 
wrong? What can we learn from the failure to implement these good ideas that can help 
us with implementation the next time?  
 
Another place to press the paper’s authors further:  Page 15, number 4 at the bottom: the 
paper says integrate “best practices.”  I am all for best practices.  The question is: what 
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are they?  The paper really should spell out precisely what it believes to be best practices 
– listing them – and explaining why they should be adopted.  
 
Finding #5 and recommendations on career paths (pp.16-19):  My key comment on the 
findings section simply would be the importance of ease of entry and exit into the 
Community at all ages, from junior analysts in their 20s all the way to renowned world-
class experts in their 50s and 60s.  The Community needs them all.   
 
My key comment would be on recommendation #1:  It speaks about multiple, 
standardized career paths with “clear requirements and standards,”  “clear incentives,” 
and “clear milestones.”   Everything is clear except what you mean.  It would be more 
helpful to spell out in detail precisely what is meant by such a career path.  No one can 
disagree at the current level of generality.   
 
I strongly agree (p.18) that IC officials, when posted to another agency, must be given 
real responsibility in that position so that they can broaden their experience.  They will 
learn very little, and will learn mostly frustration, if they are “observers” and not 
integrated into the organization.  
 
I strongly agree (p.18) that new hires will have high expectations for IT support, ease of 
exit and re-entry, and the opportunity to take sabbaticals.  These high expectations should 
be met, not as a favor to employees, but because these policies are beneficial to the 
Community and to the quality of analysis.  
 
Finding #6 and recommendations (leadership and management).  I believe the findings 
are very strong and capture accurately the critical problems of leadership and 
management in the analytic community.  
 
Recommendation number #1 really isn’t a recommendation.  It provides no guidance on a 
solution to a genuine problem.  We all agree with the proposition of the tyranny of day-
to-day production.  What is the proposed solution for protecting the analysts’ ability to 
address medium- and long-term issues? 
 
I agree strongly with recommendation #2 on training managers.  Also, it should be self-
evident (#3) that increased responsibility merits increased compensation.   
 
Finding #7 and recommendations (education and training) are very strong and well done.  
The paper is exactly right that managers view it as giving “time off” to analysts when 
they take up training and education, and that this bias reflects the fact that they have not 
had much access to training and education in their own careers.   
 
I agree strongly with recommendations #2 through #11.   Recommendation #1 sounds 
OK – using the National Intelligence University System to “coordinate all education and 
training programs across the IC.”  I am just not altogether sure what “coordinate” means 
in this context and it might be helpful to spell out exactly what the NIUS would do, and 
just as importantly, not do, to “coordinate.”  
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Closing Comments. The paper overall is very, very good.  It needs more specificity in 
certain places, as identified above.   
 
Two notes of caution:   
 
First, I am doubtful that “another major piece of legislation dealing with intelligence 
reform” (p.1) is either necessary or desirable.  The DNI needs to exercise the authorities 
he has, and he needs to issue DNI Directives to carry out his writ.  To the extent he needs 
to, he can engage the White House to issue NSPDs or Executive Orders.   
 
Intelligence reform is a once-a-generation process, and the current reforms will take 
several years to digest and incorporate.  It only adds to confusion to contemplate another 
round of intelligence reform on Capitol Hill.  As Richard Danzig pointed out so well, 
“you are likely to get many changes you didn’t ask for” once you go up to Capitol Hill.   
 
Second, the study writes that “the shock of 9/11…has produced a willingness to increase 
funding to the IC, an essential ingredient for implementing the study’s 
recommendations.”    I am not at all confident that budget increases for the IC will 
continue -- given budget deficits, Katrina, and Iraq.   Leaders in the analytic community 
will be tested to implement reform in a slow growth or even possibly no growth 
environment for the IC budget in the 2-3 years ahead.   The test of leadership here really 
rests with the DNI, who will be called upon to apportion additional resources for the 
traditionally short-changed analytic mission.    
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Creating Incentives to Build a Stronger Analytic Culture 
 
Having served in and for the U.S. Intelligence Community (IC) for over 30 years, I 
have spent some time thinking about how to improve intelligence analysis.  Most of 
my career was spent as an “all-source” analyst focused on the Soviet Navy during the 
Cold War and hot spots to which the U.S. Navy would  be tasked to respond when 
carriers were needed to demonstrate U.S. resolve.  I have witnessed instances – 
particularly at the height of the Cold War – where the intelligence community 
performed superbly, and, regrettably, others where the community fell short of the 
mark. I have thought about the intelligence failures, but what I find more instructive 
is to consider the circumstances which contributed to the intelligence successes.  Is it 
possible to replicate those conditions, and if so, how? 
 
The intelligence community is, after all, a community of analysts focused on the 
threats to the nation, our allies and our interests.  Analysis is what we do, so it is not 
surprising that when we turn the microscope inward, we think of  good ideas about 
what the analytic community should do to improve.  The 9/11 and WMD 
Commissions also have provided exhaustive checklists of what we can do to be 
better.  The Commission reviews identify problems that need to be corrected but they 
do not tell us how to make the needed changes. 
 
The most well-intentioned reforms from the top will be ineffective if the intelligence 
professionals throughout the community do not internalize the need for change to 
achieve a cultural transformation, i.e., create an Intelligence Community analytic 
corps that demonstrates tenacious resolve in attacking real and potential threats to the 
nation and our interests.  To be successful, the nation’s political, policy and 
operational leadership must engage with and partner with the IC to achieve and 
sustain success.   The difference between a set of reforms that work and one that does 
not comes down to incentives for members of the community to embrace the right 
changes for success.  Analysts in the community are bright and want to do the right 
thing to warn and advise the nation.  How can we structure a system that incentivizes 
behavior that would create the culture for consistent intelligence successes? In my 
view, three simple steps are required: 
 
 1.   Commitment and involvement by the nation’s top leadership to truly  
 set well-defined priorities, goals and objectives and to engage in active 
 dialogue with the IC.   (Note:  Accountability by the IC will result from 
 leadership engagement, i.e., leadership will hold the IC accountable and  the IC 
will establish cultural norms to hold itself accountable.) 
 
 2.     Commitment of adequate resources commensurate with the tasks and 
 expectations of the nation’s leadership. 
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 3.    Establishment of a “cultural identity” for the IC analytic corps and 
 commitment by the IC to identifying and sharing lessons learned in its 
 business for all members to learn and improve. 
 




As noted above, for the IC analytic corps to be successful, the nation’s political, policy 
and operational leadership must partner with the IC to achieve and sustain success.  
Leadership in the White House, the Congress, DOD, DOJ, State, and other Cabinet 
agencies must consistently engage to set priorities and determine objectives to provide 
clear guidance to the IC.  If the White House had made counter-terrorism truly a top 
priority with intense focus in the early and mid-90’s, the tragedy of 9/11 and the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq likely would have different outcomes.   
 
Failing to prioritize the terrorism threat was partly a function of timing – after the fall of 
the Soviet Union, it took time for the general public and the political leadership to 
become aware of newly emerging threats and respond accordingly.  In the Congress and 
the Administration, there was significant focus on capturing the “peace dividend” for 
other priorities rather than focusing on new and emerging threats to the nation. 
Tragically, in the case of 9/11, it took far too long for the right focus and priorities to 
emerge. 
 
The major root of the policymakers’ failure to identify and prioritize rests in part with 
inconsistent communication between the IC and political leadership which vary 
depending on political circumstances and personalities of the principal players.  Well 
before 9/11, the IC had identified terrorism as a significant threat to U.S. interests, but it 
took the 9/11 tragedy to build sufficient national political consensus around the war on 
terror  and to focus the nation’s leadership on IC reform and the additional resources 
needed. 
 
Now that the nation’s attention is focused, the political, policy and operational leadership 
of the nation has: 
 
 identified and prioritized the most important key intelligence targets and 
missions; 
 set up reasonable performance measures which define success against 
these targets and missions by the various members of the IC community; 
and 
 established consistent communication channels for engaging with the IC 
and continually adjusting the targets and missions in partnership with the 
IC. 
 
This level of communication and engagement with the IC cannot be reduced in the future 
or the situation which resulted in the 9/11 tragedy will likely re-emerge in the future. 
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Importantly, such levels of engagement by the senior political, policy and operational 
leadership is one of the main “incentives” that will mobilize the highest level of service 
from the IC.   Nothing can be more stimulating for an analyst than producing brilliant 
work and engaging with senior leadership to effect their understanding and actions.  
Conversely, nothing can be more debilitating than producing brilliant work and having it 
ignored. 
 
Prioritization results in choices and therefore produces risk.  Prioritization takes 
toughness, resolve and the willingness to be accountable for making choices with 
incomplete information.   Nonetheless, for a successful IC in the future, our nation’s 
leadership must choose the most important threats and focus resources against them.  We 
will not be able to guarantee success against every conceivable threat, but if our 
leadership will identify the most important threats or engage with the IC to do so, we 
have a much greater chance of preventing a repeat of a large-scale national or global 
tragedy.  To draw on my own experience, when the Navy was able to single out the 
Soviet submarine threat as its greatest priority in the 70’s and 80’s, the IC was able to 
apply its resources and efforts with outstanding results. That focus enabled the Navy to 
overcome numerous technical obstacles to counter the threat of a Soviet submarine-
launched nuclear first strike. 
 
Without goals, there is no means for measuring success or failure.  Later in this paper, I 
discuss my views on accountability measures for the intelligence community in more 
detail.  But it will take engagement by the political, policy and operational leadership to 
define specifics to produce real and lasting change in the IC.  Regular engagement will 
serve as one of the main incentives that will drive performance in the professional IC 
analytic community that the UMD’s project envisions and which I endorse in this paper. 
 
Political, policy and operational leadership must understand that priorities require 
continuous adjustment; therefore, regular and continuous dialogue with the IC analytic 
community is necessary.   The 9/11 Commission concluded that one of the problems for 
the analytic community was a lack of imagination.8  The Commission judged there was a 
lack of creative analysis of “over the horizon” threats.  This presents a dilemma for IC 
analysts.  In their struggle to be relevant to the policymaker,  analysts have created a 
voracious policymaker appetite for current intelligence which distracts analytic resources 
from more in-depth research.  Strategic in-depth intelligence analysis (also referred to as 
“term analysis”) and current analysis should not be a zero sum game.  Strategic, in-depth 
analysis serves at least two purposes -  it infuses current intelligence products with value-
added perspective and also is key to long term national security strategy, the avoidance 
of surprise, doctrinal and operational planning, and technological development.  Strategic 
in-depth analysis – correctly done and persuasively presented – will help the policymaker 
adjust priorities for a more agile national security policy.  Regular reviews of long-term 
intelligence analysis and adjustment of strategic policy should be institutionalized – in 
consultation with the IC --  at the policymaker level to avoid strategic surprise. 
 
                                                 
8 The 9/11 Commission Report:  Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the 
United States (New York:  W.W. Norton, 2004) 339-44. 
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Adequate budgetary and resource support 
 
Attaining measurable and sustainable improvement of the IC’s performance against these 
goals and in support of our national security policy requires the ultimate commitment – 
the power of the purse.  The IC needs the necessary budgetary support to accomplish 
reforms in support of clearly articulated goals.   Notwithstanding the additional spending 
since 9/11, the IC must be maintained at a sufficient level over time.  I would assert 
causing the IC to absorb large budget cuts in the early to mid-90s was a mistake.  With 
the declines in the U.S. military at the end of the Cold War, we needed, at a minimum, to 
sustain the IC as the eyes and ears of the nation to discover and illuminate emerging 
threats.   Instead, budgetary cuts, lack of specific focus and the institution of voluntary 
severance packages resulted in an exodus of many of the IC’s best analysts and severe 
reduction in crucial collection efforts.   Expecting dramatically improved performance 
without commensurate budgetary support puts the IC and the nation’s security at risk. 
 
I do not advocate writing a blank check to the IC.  Tying budgetary allocations to 
performance goals goes hand in hand with good management.  As I mention below, the 
U.S. military embraced this philosophy when it was reorganized around the jointness 
concept by the Goldwater Nichols Act passed in the 1980s.  The services were forced to 
justify spending allocations by tying them to performance goals linked to jointness 
objectives.  A similar system could be put in place for the IC. 
 
A professional analytic culture – the role of competition 
 
A professional analytic culture is the cornerstone of my argument for improved 
performance in the IC.  Based on personal experience and long observation, when the 
leadership is meaningfully engaged and resources are adequate, a strong, self governing 
analytic culture will emerge.  In my time in the Navy, this culture was described as 
Operational Intelligence or OPINTEL.  The clear mission was to penetrate, understand, 
anticipate and when required, defeat an adversary.  OPINTEL was successfully embraced 
by the Navy’s senior leadership and its intelligence analysts for over 30 years.  The 
unifying thread running through the various reports in the  Project on the Future of 
Intelligence Analysis is the call for professionalization of the intelligence analyst.  What 
would the ideal professional analytic community look like, from a functional perspective?  
 
What we need in the IC today is a professional corps of all-source intelligence analysts, 
with a cultural identity and loyalty to the analytic mission above all others, including the 
missions and bureaucratic imperatives of individual agencies.  In today’s intelligence 
community, analysts are a subset of professionals at each of the major intelligence 
agencies – CIA, DIA, State/INR, FBI, NSA, NGA, and others.  Essentially, the current 
model for much of the intelligence production is a competitive model highlighting the 
contribution of a single intelligence collection discipline – analysts are loyal to their 
home agency; each agency competes for time and access with the policymakers and/or 
the war-fighters.  This in itself is not a negative – our society, our markets and our laws 
are built on the principle of healthy, dynamic competition.  But the playing field for 
competition among the agencies is not level.  The agencies who control development of 
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collection systems compete to produce analysis to demonstrate the efficacy of their 
systems, whether they be SIGINT, imagery, MASINT or HUMINT.  These factors can 
skew the type and volume of data collected.  In a worst case scenario, the data may not be 
relevant to pressing intelligence requirements, and the collection systems may not be 
agile and responsive enough to provide the data analysts need to provide the answers to 
significant intelligence problems.   
 
At the other end of the spectrum, the CIA, whose Director formerly had the responsibility 
to report directly to the President on all intelligence matters, used its prestige and access 
to advantage.  The CIA’s position as the central repository of all-source intelligence and 
as the agency that directly supported the Director in his role as the President’s principal 
intelligence adviser, allowed “CIA analysts and officials to provide the Agency’s 
intelligence analysis to senior policymakers without having to explain dissenting views or 
defend their analysis from potential challenges from other Intelligence Community 
agencies.”9   
 
The competitive analysis model is very powerful when constructively used.   Properly 
harnessed, competitive analysis can provide a dynamic, thoughtful analytic environment.  
Intelligence analysis by its very nature is conducted with incomplete information; 
therefore, varying points of view in interpretation are natural and should be presented so 
that the leadership understands the ambiguity. The National Intelligence Strategy notes 
the need to explore methods of alternative analysis as one of the requirements of the 
intelligence community.10   However, a structure which incentivizes showcasing some 
intelligence sources over others will produce inconsistent or skewed results.  Over time, 
any system will be “gamed” by its participants to protect personal and bureaucratic 
prerogatives.  The goal should be to produce the best analysis and that goal has to be 
given primacy above the success of each individual intelligence organization.   
 
More than brains 
 
What would an IC culture that produces the best analysis look like?  It would consist of a 
cadre of smart, brilliant people dedicated to the service of the nation, who place mission 
first and who will make the personal sacrifices to ensure success.  These gifted, 
perceptive and sophisticated individuals should start or soon become experts in 
languages, foreign area studies, military operations, social studies or the sciences.  In 
addition, they should be taught to be superb communicators, equally at ease whether 
interfacing with technical experts in collection systems, or with senior policymakers in 
the government, the private sector or academia.  The depth of expertise required over a 
wide range of subject matters would produce a community as diverse in its composition 
as the subjects it is responsible for understanding.  Most importantly, this community 
would generate its own leadership – the best of the best, for intellectual leadership in 
                                                 
9 Schmitt, Gary J., Truth to Power?  Rethinking Intelligence Analysis, Hoover Press,  61. 
10  The National Intelligence Strategy, October 2005, at 5,  cites as its Enterprise Objective No. 2:  
“Strengthen analytic expertise, methods and practices; tap expertise wherever it resides; and explore 
alternative analytic views.” 
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analytical areas.   It would become a self-sustaining body whose home-grown leadership 
would instill a sense of esprit de corps, professionalism and public service. 
 
We should consider whether this group of überanalysts needs its own separate agency or 
organization.  Adding a national analytic agency as the sixth or seventh major player at 
the table when the DNI makes resource or substantive decisions gives the analytic 
community some teeth, but it also risks negative bureaucratic implications.  Nonetheless, 
the topic should be investigated and debated as we enter in an age of “intelligence 
uncertainty” very different from the Cold War era.   The analysts also need enough 
stature to be able to demand – and receive – answers from the collectors on potential 
issues and problems with sources which affect the quality of analytic conclusions.  There 
must be zero tolerance of evasion or manipulation of source material by collector 
agencies and components.  
 
A less drastic alternative to an independent analytic agency would  be the creation of a 
corps of professional analysts who rotate through a series of positions at various agencies.  
An analyst who followed this track would be better versed and experienced in the 
contributions of various sensor systems and analytical techniques. Our best analysts of 
the past each demonstrated mastery of their subject matter and the potential contribution 
of any collection system.  These analysts developed keen senses about the reliability of 
sensor information and how to factor it into their analytical judgments.   
 
Critical to the development of the professional analytic corps would be two types of 
rotation, reflecting the two most important relationships in the analytic function – 
relationships with and understanding of the collectors or sensor managers and 
relationships with the policymaker/consumers.  Rotations both at “forward deployed” 
positions as analysts in support of the policymaker or war-fighter (at the military 
commands) and with collectors should be essential professionalization requirements for 
these elite “all-source” analysts. 11   In terms of specific training for the analytic corps, 
the training should be the prestige equivalent of the National War College and the 
Command and Staff College, to prepare senior level analysts for high-level interface with 
policymakers.12
 
In addition to intimacy with all classified sources and methods,  open source analysis 
must be embraced since it is critical to solving transnational intelligence issues.  With no 
complex collection systems required to access this information, and with no secret code 
words to inflate its importance, open source analysis has previously lacked stature and 
advocates in the intelligence community.  Yet knowledge derived from open sources is 
imperative to our complete understanding of current threats.  As an example, for the 
terrorist threat coming from radical Islam, we need experts who are steeped in the culture, 
                                                 
11 There are precedents for professionalization requirements already in place.  For example, to advance to 
SIS ranks, language proficiency in one of several target (difficult) languages is required (locate citation – 
Intelligence Reform Act).  The military’s Foreign Area Officer program is another example of a streaming 
program which developed analytical and regional competencies in a subset of the officer corps. 
12 Various agencies have had rotational programs to the military staff colleges, but this has been primarily 
for those analysts focused on military intelligence and has not been a systematic requirement for 
advancement.   
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language, politics and history of Islam.  This requires extraordinary facility with 
information that is not secret – it is in plain view – but which is obscured or hidden by 
our lack of cultural insight and language ability.  Immersion in the local dialects, culture, 
politics and mindset of the intelligence target will influence the analyst’s view of the 
technical and human source collection, and can better guide the collectors.   Elevating the 
stature of the all-source analytic profession to influence collection is one avenue to 
ensure critical sources of information receive appropriate attention, whether they are 
classified technical collection, HUMINT or open sources.  
 
Another key factor that is not obvious to onlookers is that the so-called “intelligence 
cycle” is not a circle.  I prefer to look at it as a series of feedback loops, with the analyst 
at the center.  Initial problem definition may come from either a policymaker request or 
an analyst’s assessment that an issue merits analytic attention.  The analyst then looks at 
the data available and ideally may engage in a series of interactions with collectors, a 
series of feedback loops.  While in the collection phase, the analyst should be 
simultaneously engaging with the policymakers or the war fighters, as appropriate, to 
refine the questions as conditions change.  When a finished intelligence product is 
produced, it should generate further questions from the consumer, and the feedback loops 
continue.  The process operates on a continuum, as opposed to a discrete series of events 
with a defined beginning and end.   
 
The position of the analyst at the fulcrum of this process means the analyst plays a critical 
role in advising the collectors in not only collection targeting, but on the design and 
capabilities of future collection systems.  For an analyst to perform these crucial tasks 
well, sophisticated understanding (produced by the embedded rotations at different 
agencies) of the functions of collector agencies is as essential as the link with the 
policymakers or other consumers.   Contrary to the popular view that the “stovepipes” of 
collection agencies are bad, I see them as providing depth, technical excellence and 
context that could not be achieved otherwise.  The highly specialized technical 
subcultures of the various collector agencies need to be preserved with their expertise 
undiluted, but the right incentives need to be applied to require them to engage in a  
collaborative, interactive manner with members of the community.  The professional 
analytic corps would be the glue or conductive material that would enable specialized 
knowledge to flow out of the stovepipes and--once translated, synthesized and 
analyzed—be passed on to the consumer. Is there room for direct sensor reporting? Most 
definitely, yes, especially in time sensitive operations.  However, history has shown that 
the vast majority of intelligence collection needs to be given context and analytical 
substance to be most useful.   
 
The linkage to the policymaker advocated in this structure of continuous feedback is 
controversial.  Over the years the analytic community has struggled with recurrent 
charges of “politicization.”  This has led some to correlate “professionalization” of 
analysis with isolation, an “ivory tower” mentality.  While there clearly need to be checks 
and balances to preserve analytic integrity, to avoid connection with the consumer would 
result in irrelevance.  The current competitive agency model, however, also risks loss of 
integrity if agencies are tempted to provide the answer most attractive to the policymaker, 
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rather than the right one, in an effort to strengthen their institutional position.  The answer 
may lie, again, in the creation of “self-correcting mechanisms” within the professional 
analytic corps itself. In my view, the senior leadership of the IC should serve in an 
apolitical manner similar to the way the military serves while in uniform. 
 
Finding the right incentives to collaboration 
 
The solution to drive collaboration is to design a set of incentives to produce the multiple 
levels of interaction and sharing needed.  The U.S. military’s work to promote expertise 
in joint operations offers some useful parallels.  The UMD Project Report cites the 
Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols), which 
reorganized the Defense Department in the mid-80s, as an example of principles that 
could be adopted by the intelligence community.  Goldwater Nichols implemented 
sweeping change in many aspects of the military, with varying degrees of success.   What 
we should draw on from Goldwater Nichols are the aspects relevant to promoting 
“jointness.”  
 
After WW II, much as the intelligence community is struggling today with maintaining 
the multi-faceted expertise of its many collection and analytic disciplines, the military 
struggled with the tension between maintaining the separate identities and unique skills of 
the various military departments and the need to enhance the ability of US forces to 
jointly plan and execute military actions efficiently and effectively.   The main personnel 
provisions of the Act aimed at improving the jointness of the military included: 
 
 Increasing the quality of officers in joint assignments; 
 Enhancing the stability and increasing the joint experience of officers in 
joint assignments; 
 Enhancing the education and training of officers in joint matters and 
strengthening the focus of military education in preparation of officers for 
joint duty assignments; 
 Ensuring that general and flag officers are well versed in joint matters; and 
 Ensuring that officers are not disadvantaged by joint service, but are, in 
fact, rewarded for it. 13 
 
Goldwater-Nichols elevated the status of joint assignments in the military by creating a 
special category for them:  the Joint Specialty Officer or JSO.  By requiring potential 
JSOs to graduate from an accredited Joint Professional Military Education program and 
to serve at least one joint duty tour, the act fostered the perception that JSOs were elite 
and that JSO designation was desirable.  The act also required that officers could not be 
selected for promotion to brigadier general or rear admiral (lower half) unless they served 
in a joint assignment.  Joint officers were also required to be promoted at the same rate as 
those who were not joint – effectively forcing the cream of the crop into joint billets.  
This further enhanced the prestige and desirability of joint service, in effect creating a 
professional cadre of personnel within the ranks of the military services who were 
                                                 
13 Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, P.L. 99-433, 10 USC 38 (as amended). 
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perceived as the leaders of tomorrow’s military and drove the changes envisioned by the 
Act.  
 
The move to increase “jointness” is credited with dramatically improving the operational 
capabilities of the US Armed Forces, and in the opinion of General Colin Powell, making 
the Joint Staff one of the best staffs in the world.  After Operation Desert Storm in 1991, 
General Norman Schwartzkopf testified before the Senate Armed Services Committee 
that “the quality of the people that were assigned to Central Command at all levels 
changed dramatically as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.”14
 
Although the Goldwater-Nichols initiatives faced strong resistance in the individual 
services for many years, one key to its eventual success was the fact that the legislation 
provided very detailed guidance for every aspect of the joint corps, from the selection 
process and number of billets, to promotional requirements.  This “micromanagement” 
initially raised the ire of many senior military leaders, but regardless of these initial 
misgivings, the jointness provisions of Goldwater-Nichols have been so successful they 
have now been completely internalized by the military, and have contributed greatly to its 
present operational success. 
 
Avenues to power and influence 
 
Goldwater-Nichols type personnel reforms for the IC would incentivize individual 
agencies to stream and promote the formation of the professional intelligence corps, but 
the talented and gifted pool of individuals that we hope will populate the corps would be 
unlikely to choose membership unless that membership brings some reward.  In 
government, where the range of financial incentives is necessarily limited, reward is 
principally measured in terms of professional advancement.  And mere advancement will 
not be sufficiently attractive to retain individuals if the organization within which the 
advancement occurs lacks any real power or influence.   
 
Today, along with a lack of common performance standards across the analytic 
community, the analyst lacks real stature or voice. Usually analysts work in relative 
obscurity, with their only claim to fame a footnote mention in a politician’s 
autobiography or, more gratifyingly, a historic account of US foreign policy.  The 
classified nature of their work often means normal authorship rights are not available.  
The number of intelligence analysts who have risen from the ranks to Cabinet-level 
positions (including CIA Director) has been very few.  Reforms along the lines of 
Goldwater-Nichols would help advance intelligence analysts within the various agency 
power structures.  However, absent a seat at the table equivalent to that of other agency 
heads (potentially possible if a separate analytic body were created), other means of 
raising the stature of analysts within the community need to be explored.  The analytic 
corps needs to be enough of an independent body to attract, motivate and influence 
decisions and behaviors outside its boundaries.  It must be able to draw people to its 
sphere of influence and bind them to it, creating a set of symbiotic relationships in the 
process. 
                                                 
14 Locher, James R. III, “Taking Stock of Goldwater-Nichols”,  Joint Forces Quarterly, Autumn 1996. 
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In corporate terms, this type of power is viewed as a set of “decision rights.”  One way to 
pursue this might be to create an analyst “board of directors” with voting rights over 
certain types of community decisions.  The board chair might be a leader of the analytic 
corps, chosen for his or her stature and standing as a former government official and 
relationship to and understanding of the intelligence community mission.  Although 
“bottom up” incentives such as enforcing equal promotion rates and providing a clear 
professional analytic career path which fosters advancement to the highest levels are the 
most likely to produce lasting reform, some top-down restructuring is needed to ensure 
the analytic corps is vested with sufficient influence to protect the growth and 
development of the corps in its infant stages.   
 
Another source of authority is budgetary control.   Goldwater-Nichols provides another 
useful reference here, because provisions of the law mandated that the Joint Staff collect 
information on Combatant Command priorities (known as the Integrated Priority List) 
and these were then aligned to the individual service budgets.  The services were required 
to show how their budgets fit with the Combatant Command Integrated Priority List, 
which were in turn tied to Goldwater-Nichols objectives.  A similar mechanism could be 
instituted through the DNI staff in addressing budgetary and programmatic issues with 
the IC Agencies.   
 
Today there are limited mechanisms which give the analyst sufficient power to direct 
intelligence collection to solve critical problems.  Although the intelligence agencies 
currently meet, in various configurations, to discuss targeting and budget priorities, and 
the analytic corps plays a role (varying in influence by target depending on the 
forcefulness of the players involved), the analyst is not on a par with agency heads, the 
policymakers or war fighters as a customer of intelligence data.  The DNI should 
consider tying the current DDNI for Collections’ collection tasking activities more 
closely to the analytical community.  Ideally, collection would be managed on a 7x24 
basis and largely driven by a 7x24 analytical community focused on the top issues of the 
day as defined by political, policy and operational needs.   
 
Performance accountability  
 
A final set of incentives revolves around accountability.  These include negative as well 
as positive incentives.  To legitimately claim elite status, the barriers to entry to the 
professional corps must be appropriately high, and there must be sustained quality 
controls and performance assessments throughout an analyst’s career.  Unlike the military 
officer corps, currently the civilian analytic community does not have an up or out policy 
based on performance requirements.  Other professions commonly viewed as elite are 
either governed by professional requirements, market forces, or a combination of both 
(lawyers in law firms typically must make partner or find other employment after a given 
number of years;  doctors in private practice are subject to ethical and legal restrictions 
plus the rigors of finding a market for their practice; investment bankers must make 
performance targets or risk demotion; CEOs of public firms must please stockholders).  
The analytic community lacks any such governmental or external regulation.  Apart from 
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a devotion to public service  (to ignore the selflessness and patriotism of the many 
dedicated and talented personnel in the intelligence community would not be fair or 
balanced), there are few regulators to reliably instill continuous performance measures.  
In particular, the leadership of the analytic community would have to have regular 
performance assessments to determine if the performance and transformation goals of the 
community were being met. 
 
One useful approach would be to institute an annual performance assessment conducted 
by someone outside the analyst’s direct organization and based on inputs from seniors, 
peers, clients (users of the intelligence provided) and subordinates.  This suggestion is 
likely to provoke resistance from the analytic community, however, the intelligence 
community is a mature bureaucracy which does not attract risk takers.  Risk-taking needs 
to be incentivized.  Accomplishing this means, within reason, removing the negative 
incentives to risk-taking as well as instituting positive ones.   Analysts would need to 
become accustomed to an environment where healthy constructive criticism is aired on a 
regular basis.  Constructive feedback and development objectives for analysts should be 
routinely provided rather than simply when an intelligence failure (or the perception of an 
intelligence failure) occurs. 
 
Those who are unwilling to take risks fail to see that accountability builds 
professionalism.  Currently the community appears so traumatized by criticism it is afraid 
to do anything other than take the most cautious road.  For example, since 9/11, the 
prediction of another major terrorist incident in the U.S. has been that it will happen 
within a year or two.  Four years on from 9/11 we are  incident free within the U.S.  This 
type of analytical paralysis does not well serve policymakers or the American public. 
 
Others may argue that risk-taking is inappropriate when American safety and security are 
at stake.   One organizational approach to balance risk-taking with public responsibility is 
to instill cultural values – a professional code of ethics – across the analytic organization.  
When these common ethical and cultural values are instilled across the organization, they 
optimize behavior at all levels of responsibility.   In a time of extraordinary stress and 
challenge, it is not surprising that many have called for the institution of such codes for 
the analytic profession.  At best, the professional code becomes a touchstone, or, as one 
of the participants described it “a place to go when you get lost.”  A professional code is 
an enabler to help the organization become self-correcting.  Self-correction is attainable 
only if contribution and performance can be measured and motivation, reward and 
punishment can be effected.  These may be revolutionary – even scary – changes for a 





Summary of Oral Presentation by the Honorable John E. McLaughlin 
 
John McLaughlin observed that the report’s findings and recommendations contained 
nothing objectionable.  They constituted a good inventory of things that the IC wants to 
do.  In fact, one could probably find most of its recommendations in previous IC reports 
and studies.  This led him to ponder why, if all of the recommendations made sense, very 
little had been done to implement them.  He asserted that: 
1. Some progress in these directions had in fact been made; 
2. Proven methods for accomplishing some of the report’s recommendations were 
not well understood; 
3. It is very difficult to attempt large-scale, multiple reforms at the same time 
because of the complexity of the problem; 
4. The IC never had enough personnel to undertake large-scale efforts given the 
demands of its missions; and 
5. There remains the issue of weighing one or two failures against a hundred 
successes.  How drastic and comprehensive should reforms be if the basic 
institutions of the IC are sound? 
 
McLaughlin stated that the report placed too much emphasis on the idea that the IC 
resists change.  He personally had found a great recognition of the need for change within 
the IC, and he knew of dramatic examples of successful change.  He agreed that the 
current time offers a rare window of opportunity from increased change, but noted that, 
since the IC can’t institute all of the recommended changes at once for the reasons given 
above, it was necessary to prioritize them.  He recommended identifying those 
recommendations that would have a force multiplier effect on the intelligence enterprise.  
He offered the following list: 
• Emphasize technology.  So much of what the IC wants to do needs appropriate IT 
to enable it.  The focus should be on providing these capabilities.  He 
recommended that the DNI carry out a Manhattan Project on this issue. 
• Emphasize common education.  Teaching analytic tradecraft and epistemology 
should be a priority. 
• Develop a greater sense of community within the IC, but keep initiatives simple.  
For example, to be promoted, require that analysts must have served in more than 
one intelligence agency and in more than one discipline.  Then be sure to enforce 
these requirements consistently throughout the IC.  If the system gets too 
complicated, it will be too difficult to administer. 
• In terms of implementing recommendations, McLaughlin stressed the need to 
think about the environment in which the current intelligence enterprise exists.  
He emphasized that the IC must look outward and engage both intelligence 
oversight committees to obtain their support.  Otherwise, there will be hearings 
the first time reforms stumble and the process might lose momentum or be 




McLaughlin concluded by saying that the report was “a terrific articulation” of things we 
would like to do, but it needs additional work to make its recommendations capable of 




Biographical Sketches of Project Participants (Nongovernment) 
 
Gordon M. Adams 
George Washington University 
Gordon M. Adams is Professor of the Practice of International Affairs and Director of the 
Security Policy Studies Program at the Elliot School of International Relations of the 
George Washington University.  His areas of expertise include security policy, national 
security budgeting, defense industry, transatlantic defense cooperation, and defense 
industrial cooperation. 
A native Californian, Dr. Adams attended Stanford University (magna cum laude, 
Political Science).  He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University.  
Dr. Adams came to GW from the International Institute for Strategic Studies in London, 
where he held the position of Deputy Director.  Before moving to London, he served as 
the Associate Director for National Security and International Affairs of the Office of 
Management and Budget in the White House.  
Dr. Adams previously taught at Rutgers University and Columbia University. He 
has held positions at the Council on Economic Priorities, the Council on Foreign 
Relations and the Social Science Research Council. He was founder and director of the 
Defense Budget Project, which became one of Washington's leading analytical 
institutions working on the defense budget and defense policy issues from 1983 to 1993.  
In addition to being widely published on the areas of security policy, defense policy and 
budgets and transatlantic defense trade and investment policy, Dr. Adams has testified 
extensively before various committees of both houses of the U.S. Congress, and is widely 




Ramon C. Barquin, PhD is the President and CEO of Barquin International. He is a 
former IBM executive and an internationally known expert in the field of knowledge 
management. Dr. Barquin co-founded and was the first President of the Data 
Warehousing Institute, the leading professional organization in the field. He also founded 
and heads the Computer Ethics Institute. 
An electrical engineer and mathematician by training, Dr. Barquin has taught at 
MIT, the University of Maryland, and the Chinese University of Hong Kong. He edited 
the Prentice Hall series on Data Warehousing, co-edited two books on Knowledge 
Management in the public sector, and has published over 100 technical and management 
articles on information technology. He organized and chaired the E-Gov Knowledge 
Management conferences in 2000 and 2001, and has conducted executive seminars in 
electronic government and knowledge management for the Brookings Institution. 
 
Richard K. Betts 
Columbia University 
Richard K. Betts is the Arnold A. Saltzman Professor and Director of the Saltzman 
Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University.  He has also taught at 
Harvard University and Johns Hopkins’ Nitze School of Advanced International Studies, 
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and was a Senior Fellow at the Brookings Institution in Washington for fourteen years.  
He has been Director of National Security Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations 
and served long ago on the staffs of the original Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(the Church Committee), the National Security Council, and the Mondale Presidential 
Campaign.  For six years in the 1990s he was a member of the National Security 
Advisory Panel of the Director of Central Intelligence and in 1999-2000 he was a 
member of the National Commission on Terrorism (the Bremer Commission).  Betts has 
published numerous articles on U.S. foreign policy, military strategy, intelligence 
operations, security issues in Asia and Europe, terrorism, and other subjects, and is author 
four books – Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises; Surprise Attack; Nuclear 
Blackmail and Nuclear Balance; and Military Readiness – and co-author or editor of The 
Irony of Vietnam; Cruise Missiles: Technology, Strategy, and Politics; Conflict After the 
Cold War; and Paradoxes of Strategic Intelligence. 
 
James G. Breckenridge 
Mercyhurst College 
James G. Breckenridge graduated from Virginia Tech and received a Master’s Degree in 
Middle Eastern and European History from the University of Virginia, and a MBA from 
Gannon University.  Heserved in the United States Army for 22 years in a variety of 
intelligence and operations assignments.  These assignments included nine years of 
overseas duty in Europe and the Middle East.  Mr. Brekenridge taught Middle Eastern 
History and served as the course director for the World History program at West Point.  
After retirement from the Army, he served as the director of marketing and training for a 
manufacturing company before pursuing his real passion, which is teaching intelligence 




Professor Clarke, a specialist in U.S. foreign and national security policy, is coordinator 
of the United States Foreign Policy field in the School of International Service. He is the 
author of several books on foreign policy and arms control, including Send Guns and 
Money: Security Assistance and United States Foreign Policy (Praeger, 1997) and 
American Defense and Foreign Policy Institutions (Harper and Row, 1989). His articles 
have appeared in numerous journals, including Foreign Policy , Political Science 
Quarterly , Middle East Journal , and Orbis . Professor Clarke has been chosen one of 
American University's Ten Best Professors, and lauded as the Scholar/Teacher of the 
Year by the School of International Service. 
 
Dale Copeland 
University of Virginia 
Dr. Dale Copeland is Associate Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. His 
fields of interest include International Relations Theory, security studies and international 
political economy.  He is the author of The Origins of Major War, (Cornell U.P., Cornell 
Studies in Security Affairs, 2000), a study of the link between the rise and decline of 
great powers and the outbreak of devastating system-wide wars. His second book project, 
Economic Interdependence and International Conflict, examines the conditions under 
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which inter-state trade will lead to either war or peace. Other research interests include 
the origins of economic interdependence between great powers, the realist-constructivist 
divide, in-group/out-group theory and the logic of reputation-building, and the 
interconnection between international political economy and security studies. Recent 
articles include: "The Constructivist Challenge to Structural Realism" (International 
Security, Fall 2000); "Economic Interdependence and War" (International Security, 
Spring 1996); "Trade Expectations and the Outbreak of Peace" (Security Studies, 
Autumn 1999/Winter 2000). Dr. Copeland is the recipient of numerous awards, including 
MacArthur and Mellon Fellowships and a post-doctoral fellowship at the Center for 
Science and International Affairs, Harvard University. 
 
The Honorable Richard Danzig 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Richard Danzig is the Nunn Prize Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International 
Studies , a Senior Fellow at the CNA Corporation, and a consultant to the Department of 
Defense on terrorism generally and bioterrorism particularly.  Mr. Danzig served as the 
71st Secretary of the Navy from November 1998 to January 2001.  He also was the 
Under Secretary of the Navy between 1993 and 1997. 
Mr. Danzig is a director of Human Genome Sciences Corporation (NASDAQ), 
National Semiconductor Corporation (NYSE), and Saffron Hill Ventures (a European 
Venture Capital Fund).  He has ongoing relationships on business and political matters 
with several businesses, including a leading nanotechnology start-up and a large Japanese 
trading company. 
Mr. Danzig’s recent pro-bono activities include service as Chairman of the Board 
of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, and as member of the Boards of 
Directors of Public Agenda and the Partnership for Public Service.  
Mr. Danzig was born in New York City in 1944. He received a B.A. degree from 
Reed College, a J.D. degree from Yale Law School, and Bachelor of Philosophy and 
Doctor of Philosophy degrees from Oxford University, where he was a Rhodes Scholar. 
Upon his graduation from Yale, Mr. Danzig served as a law clerk to U.S. Supreme Court 
Justice Byron White.   
Between 1972 and 1977, Mr. Danzig was an Assistant and then Associate 
Professor of Law at Stanford University, a Prize Fellow of the Harvard Society of 
Fellows, and a Rockefeller Foundation Fellow. During this period he wrote a book on 
contract law and articles on constitutional history, contracts, criminal procedure, and law 
and literature. 
From 1977 to 1981, Mr. Danzig served in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of 
Defense, first as a Deputy Assistant Secretary and then as the Principal Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserve Affairs and Logistics. In these roles, he 
contributed particularly to the development of the Department’s ability to mobilize 
manpower and materiel for deployment abroad. In 1981, he was awarded the Defense 
Distinguished Public Service Award. He received that same honor—the highest 
Department of Defense civilian award—twice more in 1997 and 2001 for his work with 
the Navy and Marine Corps. 
Between 1981 and 1993, Mr. Danzig was a partner in the law firm of Latham and 
Watkins. Resident in Washington, his unusually broad legal practice encompassed white-
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collar crime defense work, civil litigation, and corporate work, including heading the 
firm’s Japan practice.  During this time he co-authored a book on National Service, 
taught contracts at Georgetown Law School, and was a Director of the National 
Semiconductor Corporation, a Trustee of Reed College, and litigation director and then 
vice chair of the International Human Rights Group. In 1991, he was awarded that 
organization’s Tony Friedrich Memorial Award as pro-bono human rights lawyer of the 
year. 
Mr. Danzig and his wife, Andrea, reside in Washington, DC, where Mrs. Danzig 
has an active practice as a psychotherapist. They have two adult children, David and Lisa.  
Mr. Danzig is completing a book on management, anticipated for completion in 2006. 
Articles about Mr. Danzig’s tenure as Navy Secretary, as well as his speeches, 
testimony, and further biographical material can be found at 
www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/danzig. 
 
G. Edward DeSeve 
University of Maryland 
G. Edward DeSeve, former Deputy Director for Management of the U.S. Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB), is Professor of the Practice and Director of the 
Management, Finance and Leadership program at the School of Public Policy, University 
of Maryland.  He also works closely with the school’s Center for Public Policy and 
Private Enterprise. 
Mr. DeSeve has held senior posts at all three levels of American government and 
in the private sector. He has served as Chief Financial Officer of the U.S. Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, Controller of OMB, and in 1997, he was appointed 
Deputy Director for Management at OMB, the highest management position in the 
federal government.  He began his career with the City of Philadelphia serving as a junior 
budget analyst, Budget Director, Deputy Director for Finance and later became Director 
of Finance.  In 1990, he served as Assistant to the Governor of Pennsylvania. 
Mr. DeSeve's ability to work across sectors led him most recently to KPMG Peat 
Marwick as a partner and national industry director.  He previously served as 
Management Director of Merrill Lynch Capital Markets, and has established and led 
several consulting firms, including Public Financial Management Incorporated, which 
provided technical assistance to more than a dozen states and localities. 
Mr. DeSeve made his mark on academia as a senior lecturer and faculty member 
at the University of Pennsylvania's Fels Center of Government.  He holds a Master of 
Government Administration in Public Finance from the University of Pennsylvania, and a 
Bachelor of Science in Labor Economics from Cornell University. 
 
Jay C. Farrar 
Center for Strategic and International Studies 
Jay Farrar is senior vice president of external relations and congressional affairs.  In this 
role, he acts as the primary CSIS liaison with Congress, the media, and foreign 
embassies.  He also has been the principal researcher at CSIS on issues and projects in 
the areas of military export controls and international trade.  
Prior to joining CSIS, Jay Farrar was at the Department of Defense where he was 
the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Legislative Affairs.  At the Defense Department, Farrar 
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was the primary liaison with the Senate.  He produced and conducted legislative 
campaigns including program assessments and updates on issues and programs as diverse 
as high technology export controls and defense procurement, to military personnel and 
long-range strategy. He was also responsible for Senate confirmations of senior defense 
appointees as well as the primary point of contact for interagency deliberations.  For his 
service, Farrar received the Department’s medal for Exceptional Public Service. 
Prior to joining DoD, Farrar served as director of legislative affairs for the 
National Security Council from 1998 to 1999.  In this role, he was a principal 
congressional liaison for the White House and the National Security Council. He played a 
central role in White House and interagency deliberations regarding encryption export 
regulations, and long-range constructive engagement on operational military matters and 
crisis situations.  From 1994 to 1998 Farrar was a legislative assistant to the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff, where he concentrated on operational, program and budget 
issues, joint-flag officer Senate confirmations, and legislative action involving global 
crises.   
Farrar served on active duty in the U.S. Marine Corps for over 22 years, where he 
participated in operations in Beirut (1983) and in Southwest Asia (1990-1991).  He is a 
member of the Council on Foreign Relations, and holds a master's degree in management 
from Central Michigan University and a bachelor's degree in communications from 
Marquette University.   
 
Ann A. Fishman 
Generational-Targeted Marketing Corporation 
Ann A. Fishman is a nationally-known speaker and consultant on how to connect to 
American’s six distinct generations.   
 During the Bush 41 and Clinton Administrations, Fishman received four U.S. 
Senate Fellowships to study generational trends.  She authored three Senate white papers, 
created Federal legislation and headed up a national workshop on intergenerational 
mentoring.  Currently, she is president of New Orleans-based Generational-Targeted 
Marketing Corporation and also serves as a member of the adjunct faculty at New York 
University. 
 She has presented or consulted to a wide range of clients, including Allstate 
Financial, Time Warner Cable, The National Geographic Society, Tulane University, The 
Governor’s Conference on Tourism (State of Nevada), PBS, Reader’s Digest, Volvo Car 
Company, The American College of Cardiology and Color Marketing Group. 
 Ms. Fishman has been featured in almost every major newspaper in the U.S., 
appeared on CNN-TV, Fox News Network, National Public Radio and BBC Radio.  For 
additional information on Ann A. Fishman, Generational-Targeted Marketing 
Corporation and generational marketing, visit www.annfishman.com. 
 
John C. Gannon 
BAE Systems 
John C. Gannon is Vice President for Global Analysis at BAE Systems.  Prior to this 
position, he served as Staff Director of the House Select Committee on Homeland 
Security (2003-2005); in the Department of Homeland Security’s Transition Planning 
Office, where he headed the White House team standing up the Information Analysis and 
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Infrastructure Protection Directorate (2001-2002); and as Vice Chairman of Intellibridge 
Corporation (2001-2002). 
Prior to these activities, Dr. Gannon served for twenty-four years at the Central 
Intelligence Agency, attaining the senior-most analytic positions.  In particular, Mr. 
Gannon was Chairman of the National Intelligence Council (1997-2001); Assistant 
Director for Analysis and Production (1998-2001); and Deputy Director for Intelligence 
(1995-1997). 
Dr. Gannon is an Adjunct Professor at Georgetown University.  He is a former 
naval officer and Vietnam veteran.  He is a recipient of several awards, most notably the 
President’s National Security Medal, the highest US intelligence award, as well as CIA’s 
Distinguished Intelligence Medal, the Distinguished Career Intelligence Medal, and the 
CIA Director’s Medal. 
Dr. Gannon holds a Ph.D. and an MA in History from Washington University in 
Saint Louis, and a BA in Psychology from Holy Cross College.  Recent publications 
include “The Strategic-Use of Open Source Information” in Intelligence and National 
Security Strategist: Enduring Issues and Challenges (Washington, DC:  National Defense 
University Press, 2004) and “Intelligence Community Reform: Let Form Follow 
Function” in Intelligencer: Journal of Intelligence Studies, Vol.13, No.1 (Spring-Summer 
2002). 
 
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler 
University of Maryland 
Project Co-Director 
The Honorable Jacques S. Gansler is Vice President for Research at the University of 
Maryland.  He holds the Roger C. Lipitz Chair in Public Policy and Private Enterprise in 
the School of Public Policy where he teaches graduate school courses and leads the 
School’s Center for Public Policy and Private Enterprise. Dr. Gansler is also the Glenn L. 
Martin Institute Fellow of Engineering at the A. James Clarke School of Engineering; an 
Affiliate Faculty member at the Robert H. Smith School of Business; and a Senior Fellow 
at the James MacGregor Burns Academy of Leadership (all at the University of 
Maryland). 
Previously, Dr. Gansler served as the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics from November 1997 until January 2001. In this position, he 
was responsible for all matters relating to Department of Defense acquisition, research 
and development, logistics, acquisition reform, advanced technology, international 
programs, environmental security, nuclear, chemical, and biological programs, and the 
defense technology and industrial base.  (He had an annual budget of over $180 Billion, 
and a workforce of over 300,000.) 
Prior to this appointment, Dr. Gansler was Executive Vice President and 
Corporate Director for TASC, Incorporated, an applied information technology company, 
in Arlington, Virginia (from 1977 to 1997) during which time he played a major role in 
building the company from a small operation into a large, widely-recognized and greatly-
respected corporation, serving both the government and the private sector. 
From 1972 to 1977, he served in the government as Deputy Assistant Secretary of 
Defense (Material Acquisition), responsible for all defense procurements and the defense 
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industry; and as Assistant Director of Defense Research and Engineering (Electronics) 
responsible for all defense electronics Research and Development.   
His prior industrial experience included: Vice President (Business Development), 
I.T.T. (1970-1972); Program Management, Director of Advanced Programs, and Director 
of International Marketing, Singer Corporation (1962-1970); and Engineering 
Management, Raytheon Corporation (1956-1962). 
Dr. Gansler serves (and has served) on numerous Corporation Boards of 
Directors, and governmental special committees and advisory boards: including Vice 
Chairman and member, Defense Science Board (17 years); member of the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) Advisory Board (10 years); and senior 
consultant to the "Packard Commission" on Defense Acquisition Reform; Chairman, 
Board of Visitors, Defense Acquisition University; Director, Procurement Round Table; 
Chairman, Industry Advisory Board, University of Virginia, School of Engineering; 
Chairman, Board of Visitors, University of Maryland, School of Public Affairs; and 
member of the FAA Blue Ribbon Panel on Acquisition Reform. He is a Member of the 
National Academy of Engineering and a Fellow of the National Academy of Public 
Administration. 
Additionally, from 1984 to 1997, Dr. Gansler was a Visiting Scholar at the 
Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (a frequent guest lecturer in 
Executive Management courses).  He is the author of 3 books, a contributing author of 26 
other books, author of over 100 papers, and a frequent speaker and Congressional 
witness. 
Dr. Gansler holds a BE in Electrical Engineering from Yale University, a MS in 
Electrical Engineering from Northeastern University, a MA in Political Economy from 




9/11 Public Discourse Project 
Chris Kojm is the president of the 9/11 Public Discourse Project and former deputy 
director of the 9/11 Commission. Prior to that, he served from 1998 until February 2003 
as Deputy Assistant Secretary for Intelligence Policy and Coordination in the State 
Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He served previously in the Congress 
on the staff of the House International Relations Committee, under Ranking Member Lee 
Hamilton as Deputy Director of the Democratic staff (1997-98), as Coordinator for 
Regional Issues (1993-1997) and under Chairman Hamilton on the Europe and Middle 
East subcommittee staff (1984-92). From 1979-1984, he was a writer and editor with the 
Foreign Policy Association in New York City. He has a Masters in Public Affairs from 
the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University (1979) and an A.B. from Harvard 
College (1977). 
 
William J. Lahneman 
University of Maryland 
Project Executive Director 
William J. Lahneman is Associate Director for Programs at the Center for International 
and Security Studies at Maryland (CISSM), School of Public Policy, University of 
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Maryland, College Park.  He is an adjunct faculty member at the School of Public Policy, 
American University’s School of International Service, and the Naval Postgraduate 
School’s Center for Homeland Defense and Security.  Dr. Lahneman has held academic 
positions as Associate Chair of the Political Science Department at the U.S. Naval 
Academy and as Adjunct Professor at Towson University.  He has consulted on energy 
and environmental security issues for the World Bank, the US government, and the 
private sector.  A former career naval officer, Commander Lahneman, U.S. Navy (ret.) 
was a Surface Warfare Officer with specializations in Strategic Planning, International 
Negotiations, and Nuclear Propulsion. 
Dr. Lahneman’s recent publications include "Knowledge Sharing in the 
Intelligence Community After 9/11," International Journal of Intelligence and 
Counterintelligence 17/4 (Winter 2004-05); “Outsourcing the IC’s Stovepipes?” 
International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence 16/4 (Winter 2003-04); and 
Military Intervention:  Cases in Context for the 21st Century (ed.) (Lanham, MD:  
Rowman and Littlefield, 2004).  He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from the 
Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), an M.A. in 
National Security Affairs from the Naval Postgraduate School, and a B.S. (with 
Distinction) from the United States Naval Academy. 
 
Martin C. Libicki 
RAND 
Dr. Libicki, a Senior Policy Analyst at RAND since 1998, works on the relationship 
between information technology and public policy, notably national security.  
 This work is documented in numerous monographs, the most recent of which is 
Scaffolding the New Web: Standards and Standards Policy for the Digital Economy. It 
follows the commercially published Information Technology Standards: Quest for the 
Common Byte. His most recent assignments were to develop a post-9/11 information 
technology strategy for the U.S. Department of Justice and an information security analysis 
for the FBI; as well as to conduct a technological critique of CIA’s R&D venture, In-Q-Tel. 
Other work has examined information warfare and the revolution in military affairs. Prior 
employment includes twelve years at the National Defense University, three years on the 
Navy Staff as program sponsor for industrial preparedness and three years as a policy 
analyst for the GAO's Energy and Minerals Division. 
 Dr. Libicki received his PhD from U.C. Berkeley (1978) writing on industrial 
economics.  He has also received a Master's in City Planning from U.C. Berkeley (1974), 
and a Bachelor's degree in Mathematics from MIT (1972). 
 
John M. (Mike) McConnell 
Booz Allen Hamilton 
Mike McConnell, a Senior Vice President with Booz Allen Hamilton based at McLean, 
VA, is focused in the Defense and National Security business.  Mike joined Booz Allen 
in 1996, after retiring from the U.S. Navy as Director of the U.S. National Security 
Agency.  He also served as the Intelligence Officer for Gen. Colin Powell, Chairman 
JCS, during Desert Shield/Storm and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.  
He led NSA at the end of the Cold War in addressing the agency’s transformation 
to adapt to the multi-polar threats posed by the changing international environment. 
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Under Mike’s leadership, the NSA routinely provided global Intelligence and 
Information Security Services to the President and his cabinet in addition to military and 
civil departments and intelligence customers.  While serving as NSA’s Director, Mike 
was one of the first senior officials to identify information assurance (IA) and 
information defense as major strategic issues in our increasingly networked society.  His 
discussions in the Department of Defense, the White House, the Congress, and in 
industry in 1994 laid the foundation for the significant changes initiated since 1996.  
After bringing Booz Allen’s Information Assurance Business Campaign to 
fruition, Mike is currently leading the national security arena focused on policy, 
transformation, homeland security, and intelligence analytics.  He is also leading a new 
business initiative focused on making intelligence information more timely and relevant 
to policy, operations, and tactical decision makers.  His clients include intelligence 
departments and agencies of the Department of Defense, the Military Services, and the 
U.S. Unified Combatant Commanders. 
Mike retired as a Vice Admiral after serving 29 years as a career Intelligence 
Officer.  He holds a M.P.A. from George Washington University, is a graduate of the 
National Defense University (Global Telecoms), the Joint Military Intelligence College 
(Strategic Intelligence), and holds a B.A. in Economics from Furman University.  In 
addition to many military awards, Mike holds the nation’s highest award for service in 
the intelligence community.  Consulting Magazine selected Mike as one of the top 25 
most influential consultants in 2002.  He currently serves on the Board of Directors of 
CompuDyne. 
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John E. McLaughlin is a Senior Fellow in the Merrill Center for Strategic Studies at the 
Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS) of the Johns Hopkins 
University. 
Mr. McLaughlin, a 1966 graduate of SAIS, most recently served as Acting 
Director of Central Intelligence from July to September 2004 and as the Deputy Director 
of Central Intelligence at the Central Intelligence Agency, Vice Chairman for Estimates 
and Acting Chairman of the National Intelligence Council. 
Earlier in his career with the CIA, which spanned three decades, Mr. McLaughlin 
focused on European, Russian, and Eurasian issues in the Directorate of Intelligence.  In 
the late 1980s and early 1990s, he served as Director of the Office of European Analysis 
during the period marked by the fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of communism in 
Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 
Then, four months after the break-up of the Soviet Union, he became Director of 
the CIA Office – Slavic and Eurasian Analysis – that was responsible for CIA’s analysis 
of the fifteen independent states that emerged from the USSR.  During this time, he 
frequently represented the Intelligence Community on the US diplomatic missions that 
established initial relations with these newly-independent countries. 
While Deputy Director for Intelligence from 1997 to 2000, he created the Senior 
Analytic Service, a CIA career track that enables analysts to rise to very senior rank 
without branching out into management.  He also founded the Sherman Kent School for 
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Intelligence Analysis, an institution dedicated to teaching the history, mission, and 
essential skills of the analytic profession to new CIA employees. 
In addition to earning his masters degree in international relations from 
SAIS/Johns Hopkins, he received a bachelors’ degree from Wittenberg University and 
completed graduate work in comparative politics at the University of Pennsylvania.  He 
served as a US Army officer in the 1960s, completing a tour in Vietnam from 1968 to 
1969, where he was awarded the Bronze Star and the Army Commendation Medal with 
Oak Leaf Cluster. 
Mr. McLaughlin is the recipient of the Distinguished Intelligence Community 
Service Award and the National Security Medal.  He is a member of the Council on 
Foreign Relations, a non-resident senior fellow at the Brookings Institution, and a 
national security advisor to the Cable News Network (CNN). 
 
Kenneth T. Stringer, Jr. 
Booz Allen Hamilton 
Dr. Kenneth Stringer joined Booz Allen Hamilton in 2004 after 20 years of distinguished 
service with the Central Intelligence Agency.  
During his career with the CIA, Dr. Stringer served in a variety of analytic and 
managerial positions in the Directorate of Intelligence, including overseas assignments in 
South Asia and Europe.  From 1997 to 2000, while stationed in Europe, he developed and 
implemented a groundbreaking pilot program to deepen and enhance Directorate of 
Intelligence expertise on Near Eastern, South Asian, and African issues through regular 
exchanges with European experts. He returned to Washington in 2000 to become the first 
Director of the Sherman Kent Center for Intelligence Analysis, where he established an 
entirely new organization dedicated to building and sharing knowledge on the profession 
of intelligence analysis.   
In August 2001, Dr. Stringer was selected to lead the South Asia Issue Group in 
the Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis and, in the aftermath of  the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, he led a multi-disciplinary group of supervisors and analysts providing 
critical all-source analysis to the President and other senior US decision makers, as well 
as direct analytic support to CIA officers and the US military in the field,  throughout 
Operation Enduring Freedom and during subsequent developments crucial to US policy 
interests in South Asia.   
Prior to his career with the CIA, Dr. Stringer served with the Multinational Force 
and Observers monitoring the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty in the Sinai.  He has a Ph.D. 
in military and diplomatic history from The American University, and is a decorated 
combat veteran of the Vietnam Conflict.   
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University of Maryland and Director of the Center for International and Security Studies 
at Maryland (CISSM). His work has focused on issues of international security and 
related problems of international policy. 
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Steinbruner was Director of the Foreign Policy Studies Program at the Brookings 
Institution from 1978-1996.  Prior to joining Brookings, he was an Associate Professor in 
the School of Organization and Management and in the Department of Political Science 
at Yale University from 1976 to 1978.  From 1973 to 1976, he served as Associate 
Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard 
University, where he also was Assistant Director of the Program for Science and 
International Affairs.  He has held the positions of Executive Director of the Research 
Seminar on Bureaucracy, Politics, and Policy at Harvard's Institute of Politics, and of 
Assistant Professor of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology.   
Steinbruner has authored and edited a number of books and monographs, 
including most recently: The Cybernetic Theory of Decision:  New Dimensions of 
Political Analysis (Princeton University Press, originally published 1974, second 
paperback edition with new preface, 2002); Principles of Global Security (Brookings 
Institution Press, 2000).   His articles have appeared in Arms Control Today, The 
Brookings Review, Foreign Affairs, International Security, Scientific American, Soviet 
Economy, and other journals. 
Steinbruner is currently Vice-Chair of the Committee on International Security 
and Arms Control of the National Academy of Sciences, Co-Chair of the Committee on 
International Security Studies of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences and 
Chairman of the Board of the Arms Control Association. He is a fellow of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences and a member of the Council on Foreign Relations.  
Born in 1941 in Denver, Colorado, Steinbruner received his A.B. from Stanford 
University in 1963, and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology in 1968. 
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Dr. Phil Williams is Professor of International Security in the Graduate School of Public 
and International Affairs at the University of Pittsburgh.  From 1992 until April 2001, Dr. 
Williams was the Director of the University’s Matthew B. Ridgway Center for 
International Security Studies and he is currently the Director of the Ridgway Center’s 
Program on Terrorism and Transnational Crime.   Professor Williams has published 
extensively in the field of international security including Crisis Management, (1976) The 
Senate and US Troops in Europe, (1986) and (with Mike Bowker) Superpower Detente: 
A Reappraisal (1987).  He has edited or co-edited books on the Carter, Reagan, and Bush 
Presidencies, as well as on Classic Readings in International Relations.  During the last 
ten years his research has focused primarily on transnational organized crime and he has 
written articles on various aspects of this subject in Survival, Washington Quarterly, The 
Bulletin on Narcotics, Temps Strategique, Scientific American, Criminal Organizations, 
and Cross Border Control.   
In addition, Dr. Williams is editor of a journal entitled Transnational Organized 
Crime.  He is a consultant to both the United Nations and United States government 
agencies on organized crime and transnational threats and has also given congressional 
testimony on the subject.  Most recently he has focused on alliances among criminal 
organization, global and national efforts to combat money laundering, and trends and 
developments in cyber-crime.  Dr Williams has edited a volume on Russian Organized 
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Crime and a book on Illegal Immigration and Commercial Sex: The New Slave Trade. He 
is also co-editor of a recent volume on Combating Transnational  Crime  He is currently 
completing a book for Polity Press on Transnational Organized Crime.  In 2001-2002 he 
was on Sabbatical from the University of Pittsburgh and was a Visiting Scientist at 
CERT/CC Carnegie Mellon University, where he worked on computer crime and 
organized crime.  Dr Williams is currently directing a project for the Defense Intelligence 
Agency on the Financing of Terrorism.  He is also focusing on methods of degrading 
criminal and terrorist networks.       
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policy positions in the public and private sector as Director of International Programs and 
Resources on the National Security Council, The White House (1993-1994); Director of 
the Policy and Planning Unit, Office of the Director, U.S. Information Agency (1994); 
and as Deputy Director of the Global Information Infrastructure Commission (1994-
1995).  He has also served as a Visiting Senior Fellow at the Council on Foreign 
Relations in New York. 
Prior to joining the University of Maryland Faculty in 1992, Dr. Wilson taught at 
the University of Michigan, serving as the Director of the Center for Research on 
Economic Development and teaching the core foreign policy course at the Institute for 
Public Policy Studies.  Wilson is also Visiting Scholar in Public Diplomacy at USC, and 
an advisor to the World Bank.  Dr. Wilson is the author of “What Social Science Theory 
Can Do For Policy Makers: The Relevance of Theory For Foreign Policy” in 
International Relations Theory and U.S. Foreign Policy; of Diversity and U.S. Foreign 
Policy (Routledge, 2004); and the Information Revolution and Developing Countries 
(MIT, 2004); and co-author of The Decade of Energy Policy.  He holds degrees from 





Summary of Findings and Recommendations 
 
I.  IC Cultural Issues 
 
Finding #1:  The U.S. intelligence community is the “Community that Isn’t.”  It is a 
series of nearly autonomous organizations, each with its own way of doing business.  The 
analytic portion of the IC reflects the fragmentation of the overall intelligence enterprise.  
Such a fragmented approach is at odds with the need for greater knowledge sharing to 
enable effective analysis of dispersed threats and other issues. 
Recommendation:  Establish the basis for the profession of intelligence analyst across the 
IC. 
1. The DNI or suitable panel should coordinate the drafting of a mission statement 
for all members of the intelligence enterprise, a separate mission statement for all 
IC analysts, common doctrine for the analytic enterprise, and standardized job 
descriptions for analytic positions. 
2. Create professional standards across the IC  
3. Increase collaboration across agencies by crafting an IC-wide doctrine for 
knowledge sharing. 
4. Mandate rotational assignments for analysts throughout the IC. 
5. Make all new systems and programs flexible.  New initiatives must be able to 
incorporate new developments readily. 
6. Institutionalize the development of new ideas.  The IC should establish a center – 
with a virtual component so that analysts can participate from any location– 
where analysts can test new ideas without penalty. 
 
Finding #2:  IC dialogue with expertise outside of the IC is limited.  The increasing 
importance of open source intelligence means that IC analysts must share certain 
information and knowledge with experts in academia, business, and research centers 
around the world.  This need will increase significantly by 2020. 
Recommendation:  Expand and standardize analysts’ abilities to consult and otherwise 
interface with nongovernment experts – including non-US nationals – by issuing 
appropriate IC-wide doctrine.  This doctrine must be biased toward enabling 
collaboration while preserving standards for protecting secrets, sources, and methods. 
1. Provide sabbaticals and extended external training.  Policies concerning rotational 
assignments should include provisions for analysts to leave the IC temporarily, 
not just rotate within the IC. 
2. Encourage peer review of analytic products by outside experts.  The IC should 
expand its use of collaborative peer review tools to improve analysis. 
3. Expand outsourcing activities.  The IC should outsource appropriate work to think 
tanks, academic research centers, and companies.  This technique brings different 
perspectives, methodologies, and expertise to bear on the analytic process. 
4. Reduce constraints preventing contractors from working at the same level as 
government employees. 
5. Encourage the open world to link with analysts. 
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Finding #3:  Physical and information security and clearance systems vary across the IC 
and are incompatible with many important partners at the state and local levels of 
government.  These factors, along with lack of common information technology 
standards, impede knowledge sharing.  Security clearance policies also adversely affect 
analyst recruitment. 
Recommendation:  Develop overarching technological, security, and classification 
standards for the entire IC.  These systems should support the analytic enterprise and 
must be responsive to changing conditions. 
1. Create common standards for IT.  Any standard should be interoperable and 
scalable. 
2. Create standardized security and classification systems across the IC.  Security 
policy needs to reflect the idea that the IC needs to work collaboratively and hire 
an increasingly diverse workforce as well as protect secrets, sources, and 
methods. 
3. Create an IC-wide information repository.  Analysts should be able to go to one 
place to find out what information is available across the IC and how they can 
access it. 




II.  Analyst Leadership, Management, and Career Dynamics 
 
Finding #4:  The IC lacks common human resource standards.  There is a need for 
common standards for recruitment, hiring, retention, certification, training and 
promotion across the IC. 
Recommendation:  Create compatible, standardized human resource policies across the 
IC. 
1. Implement standardized, collaborative IC-wide recruiting policies.   
2. Emphasize “IC branding” over individual agency branding in the analyst 
recruitment process. 
3. Institute a common IC-wide personal system with regulations detailing how to 
promote and compensate analysts and managers. 
4. Integrate “best practices” in IC hiring and promotion across all IC agencies.   
5. Expand internship opportunities for prospective analysts. 
6. Generate standardized HR data.  Collect baseline data on intellectual capital 
across the IC.  Doing so not only will document analytic workforce skills but also 
will warn about the impending loss of skills through retirement.  It also will 
provide the basis for constructing the IC-wide information repository. 
7. Establish standards for firing.  Retention is not an end unto itself.  The IC wants to 
retain the best people, not maximize retention of all the analysts it hires. 
8. Hire adequate numbers of analysts to support career development, training and 
rotation.  This must include continuing training requirements and both internal 
and external rotation as part of a normal career path. 
9. Develop policies to allow analysts who have left the IC to return without penalty. 
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10. Develop a program identify in advance and utilize on demand non-government 
experts and former IC analysts in a large-scale, organized fashion to confront 
threats in areas of the world where the IC has a paucity of expertise. 
11. Recruit analysts with nontraditional backgrounds. 
 
Finding #5:  The IC must create clear career paths that motivate analysts to remain 
engaged as members of the IC.  Insofar as possible, these should be common career 
paths that are valid throughout the IC so that analysts and managers know what is 
expected of them. 
Recommendation:  Create a common IC-wide career development program. 
1. Provide multiple, standardized career paths with clear requirements and standards.   
2. Create mentoring across the IC.  In addition to formal requirements, managers 
should support a mentoring environment within the organization. 
3. Encourage transfers and rotations inside the IC.  Make the accomplishment of 
rotational tours a requirement for analysts and managers to be promoted.  When 
posted to another IC agency, analysts and managers should be given real jobs 
rather than merely exposed to the host organization’s operations. 
4. Manage expectations and engagement.  The IC is now hiring new analysts with 
different backgrounds and expectations than the current workforce. 
 
Finding #6:  Effective leadership and management are critical to ensuring an effective 
analytic enterprise.  Managers are largely responsible for the quality of analytic 
products.  They also decisively affect the retention of analysts by their leadership style 
and influence on organizational culture. 
Recommendation:  Improve analyst leadership and management across the IC. 
1. Change how performance is measured to reflect quality of analysis over quantity 
of analytic product.  Production has become the predominant metric because it is 
the simplest way out. 
2. Train managers.  The IC should standardize and place greater emphasis on 
educating and training its managers, including continuing education at all levels.  
This process should begin with providing analysts selected to become managers 
with appropriate training before they assume their management duties.  . 
3. Reward managers through an appropriate incentive system.  Managers who 




III.  Education and Training 
 
Finding #7:  Education and training are low priority activities throughout the IC.  If 
there is one cultural attitude that is uniform across the IC, it is a bias against allowing 
analysts to take time away from their jobs for training. 
Recommendation:  Improve education and training in the IC to improve the quality of 
analysis, professionalize the analytic workforce, and foster a common IC culture. 
1. Use the National Intelligence University System (NIUS) to coordinate all 
education and training programs across the IC, including agency-specific 
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programs.  The NIUS also should develop and coordinate IC-wide education and 
training programs offered by universities. 
2. Require common training.  Make as many education and training programs as 
possible IC-wide initiatives.  This will foster collaboration and reinforce a 
common IC culture. 
3. Initiate a mandatory, joint “boot camp” for all analysts in the IC within the first 6 
months of employment.  Topics of instruction should include ethics and 
tradecraft. 
4. Make use of new formats for education and training that are available in both 
university and IC in-house settings.  These include certificate programs and 
executive education offerings offered by universities. 
5. Develop a coordinated education and training continuum for managers as well as 
analysts so that education and training becomes a standard, periodic feature of 
analysts’ and managers’ careers. 
6. Make the accomplishment of mandatory educational and training milestones a 
requirement for analysts and managers to be promoted. 
7. Institute continuing education requirements across the analytic community. 
8. Develop an IC-wide officer-in residence program based on the CIA’s officer-in-
residence program. 
9. Explore the possibility of having university professors serve as scholars-in 
residence at IC agencies. 
10. Size the analyst workforce to allow an appropriate percentage of analysts to 
engage in education and training without causing the rest of the workforce to be 
chronically shorthanded . 
11. Since newly hired analysts often must wait a considerable length of time for their 
security clearances to be processed, the IC should consider using this time 
constructively for initial, unclassified education and training. 
12. Expand the Intelligence Community Academic Centers of Excellence Program. 
 
IV.  Implementation Strategies 
 
Finding #8.  Some of the report’s recommendations have been identified in previous 
studies but have not been implemented.  This is due to resistance from within the IC.  
Strong resistance to this report’s recommendations also should be expected, making it 
critically important to devise appropriate implementation strategies and detailed action 
plans to guide the process and maintain continuing pressure for change. 
Recommendation:  Develop certain report recommendations in greater detail. 
1. Study the broader trends and activities that offer opportunities for improving 
analytic processes.   
2. Research the relationship between collectors and analysts to identify additional 
ways to improve the analytic enterprise. 
3. Perform additional research to obtain information concerning how analysts differ 
in terms of their particular disciplines and skill sets, as well as the unique 
problems they face. 
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4. Further develop the concept of “intelligence analyst professional.”  It is at the 
heart of the report’s recommendations and should be examined in all its 
dimensions to maximize the utility of the concept. 
5. Conduct further research to identify best practices for constructing a center act as 
a clearinghouse for new ideas, a means to test promising concepts, and a 
repository and distribution point for lessons learned. 
6. Perform additional research to develop an appreciation for the barriers to outreach 
that exist outside the analytic community. 
7. Study the reasons why past initiatives to improve intelligence analysis were not 
implemented so that past mistakes can be avoided. 
8. Conduct further research to identify best practices in hiring and promotion 
practices throughout the IC. 
9. Conduct a study to identify the actual number of analysts who would be affected 
by the report’s recommendations so that budgetary implications can be identified 
and analyzed. 
10. Further develop the concept of standardized career paths within the analytic 
community to enable human resource departments to begin constructing prototype 
models. 
11. Research alternatives to using volume of production as the principal metric for 
assessing performance in the analytic community. 
12. Develop recommendations concerning exactly how the National Intelligence 
University System would coordinate an IC-wide training and educational effort. 
13. Several recommendations can be developed further by using current IC data about 
recent performance. 
 
Finding #9:  Additional legislation is not necessary to implement the report’s 
recommendations. 
Recommendation:  Implement the report’s recommendations using existing lines of 
authority within the IC. 
1. The DNI is empowered to bring about needed change in the IC’s approach to the 
analytic enterprise, but strong leadership will be required to overcome expected 
resistance in many parts of the IC. 
2. Use of an outside organization serving as honest broker to monitor 
implementation has distinct advantages over depending on the IC to monitor its 
own progress. 
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